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As part of the Mineta transportation Institute’s (MtI’s) continuing research effort on high-
speed rail (HSR) security and safety, this report presents an analysis of information relating 
to attacks, attempted attacks, and plots against HSR systems. 
While terrorist attacks aimed at trains and buses have increased over the past several 
decades, very few attacks have targeted HSR. to gain possible insights into the 
consequences of successful terrorist attacks against HSR, this inquiry includes accidents 
and other HSR incidents that have resulted in injuries, fatalities, or extensive asset damage. 
the authors also reviewed security at selected HSR systems in europe and Japan to 
identify measures that could be applied to HSR systems currently under development in 
the United States. these three lines of inquiry are used in this report to develop an overall 
strategy for HSR security. 
parT I—SecurITy prIncIpleS and MeaSureS
Almost any discussion of security causes many HSR proponents to bristle. they worry 
not only that mere mention of the issue will invite proposals for security regimes or heavy-
handed government edicts that will interfere with fast, convenient rail travel but that even 
talking about terrorist threats might somehow undermine campaigns to win support for 
new HSR systems. 
However, the subject of security need not create adversaries, and the right time to initiate 
a discussion is now, as new HSR systems are being designed and built. this report is 
intended to inform that discussion by addressing the following questions:
1. does HSr Merit More Security or different Security Measures than other 
passenger rail?
HSR creates opportunities to improve security. Like airports, most railway stations were built 
decades before security became a major concern and had to be modified and retrofitted 
for security. HSR expansion in the United States will bring about the construction of new 
stations, right-of-ways (RoWs), and rolling stock and therefore represents an opportunity 
to design and build in security at the beginning. 
Some argue that HSR merits more security, for a number of reasons. they contend that 
HSR is an iconic target, making it more attractive to terrorists than non-HSR. It is true that 
visually and symbolically, HSR trains are much like the streamliners and famous named 
passenger trains of the 1930s and 1940s. But new Metro lines are also modern in looks 
and have an iconic quality. As high-speed trains become more common and operate simply 
as faster commuter trains, their iconic premium will diminish.
It is also argued that derailed high-speed trains would result in more casualties. the data 
show that HSR derailments can be disastrous, but the average number of casualties in the 
data is driven by just two accidents and one case of sabotage.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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HSR trains carry an elite passenger load. true now, but this feature will diminish as HSR 
becomes more common and serves growing numbers of ordinary commuters.
Finally, the construction of HSR systems could provoke opposition from some members 
of local communities who might be tempted to take disruptive action. HSR systems may 
face local opposition from those who may see them as threats to their local community. In 
europe, anarchists and malicious pranksters have disrupted HSR.
But HSR also has characteristics that make it less attractive to terrorists. passenger 
loads on HSR trains, per car and per train, are typically less than those on slower-speed 
commuter or intercity trains, reducing the chances of replicating the high body counts 
achieved in the worst terrorist attacks on such systems.
Reservations and advance ticket sales for HSR travel create opportunities for identity 
checks. Unlike regional or commuter rail, HSR usually has all-reserved seating, which 
requires making an advanced booking. However, this practice may not be followed where 
HSR serves as commuter rail.
exclusive HSR RoWs, often fenced, hard roadbed, and seamless rail construction reduce 
the vulnerability of the tracks to unauthorized intentional access and increase the chances 
of detection of sabotage. 
2. Is it appropriate to consider reducing Security for passenger rail?
If the expansion of HSR offers an opportunity to examine security enhancements, it should 
also be an occasion to have a sensible discussion about risk to all rail passengers—HSR 
and non-HSR. Security should not become a ratchet where the current level becomes the 
norm and can only be increased.
In the past 40 years, only one person in the United States died as a consequence of a 
terrorist attack on a rail target—the 1995 derailment of the Sunset Limited. Nevertheless, 
the long-term increase in the number and lethality of terrorist attacks on trains and buses 
worldwide argues for continued security measures. Between 9/11 and December 31, 2012, 
2,190 terrorist or serious criminal attacks were made against public surface transportation, 
resulting in 4,304 fatalities. Of these attacks, 870 were against rail targets, resulting in 
1,362 fatalities.
In addition to those attacks, 15 terrorist plots that we know about against rail passengers 
either failed or were foiled by authorities. While most of these plots were interrupted in their 
early planning stages, they were intended to kill in quantity.
Just as it is hard to make the case that HSR requires more security than non-HSR, it is 
difficult to argue that HSR requires less security. An argument can be made that some of 
the security measures currently in place for all passenger rail are unnecessary, but that 
is an argument about rail security in general, not about the differences between HSR and 
non-HSR.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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3. What Threats drive Security concerns?
Security for passenger rail is driven by both actual and anticipated events:
• Improvised explosive devices (IeDs) detonated on board trains or at stations
• An active shooter or multiple shooters on board a train or at stations 
• Attempts to derail trains by sabotaging the tracks with IeDs, using mechanical 
means, or placing obstacles on the tracks
• Disruption of traffic by attacking cables or signaling systems, bomb threats, or other 
means
4. What can be learned from HSr Security in europe and Japan?
Special security measures are in effect for the eurostar trains that run between London 
and Paris and Brussels. These measures initially reflected concerns about the terrorist 
campaign being conducted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which was active in the 
United Kingdom (UK) during the construction of the tunnel under the english Channel. 
preventing illegal immigration to the UK is also an important concern. 
terminals for the eurostar have dedicated platforms, separated from the stations’ other 
platforms. eurostar passengers enter through a special entrance inside the station, 
where luggage is x-rayed and passengers are screened. passport control and customs 
inspections are completed at the boarding station so that upon arrival, passengers merely 
disembark. 
Other high-speed trains are treated the same as ordinary passenger trains—there is no 
passenger or luggage screening or other security checks, even for cross-border trains, 
although random ticket or ID checks can occur on board some trains. Countries within the 
Schengen space operate on the principle of free circulation and reflect the general attitude 
that without new technologies that do not yet exist, any form of passenger screening would 
delay travel times and, given current threat assessments, are unwarranted. 
Passengers on some high-speed trains must have their ID confirmed, and their baggage 
is scanned. Selected passengers may be subjected to a personal search. Spain also has 
ticket controls at the platform entrance. 
German authorities have not mandated passenger or luggage screening for HSR trains. 
Germany has no dedicated high-speed corridors or platforms, so HSR is fully integrated 
into the national rail system, making it virtually impossible to separate HSR from non-HSR 
passengers. Germany relies primarily on surveillance, utilizing both uniformed guards and 
closed-circuit television (CCTV) at train stations.
Following the terrorist bomb attacks on London’s tube in 2005, British officials carried out 
trials to test the feasibility of mass passenger screening. they found that while riders were 
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generally positive about the need for security, they were unwilling to accept major delays 
or the loss of privacy that came with screening. Despite the continuing high terrorist threat 
level, the Department of transport concluded that airport-style screening of all rail and 
underground passengers was not possible with the technology available.
European countries—in particular, the UK, France, and Germany—make extensive use 
of CCTV. In addition, armed police are deployed at train and subway stations and on the 
trains. New stations such as the station in Avignon, France, and the stations along the new 
Meteor Metro line in paris, are designed to facilitate surveillance. they have open spaces, 
have no dim corners, and are well lit.
As for track security, HSR RoWs are fenced along their entire length. Level crossings are 
not permitted. Bridges over the lines have sensors to detect objects that fall or that may 
be thrown onto the tracks. In the 1990s in France, early-morning sweeper trains were 
dispatched before passenger traffic began.
there are no screening procedures for passengers boarding high-speed or other trains in 
Japan. After the 1995 sarin attacks on Tokyo’s subways, CCTV surveillance was increased 
and surveillance cameras were installed on board trains to keep passengers “feeling 
secure.”
In sum, with the exception of the eurostar and some longer-distance trains in Spain, there 
are no separate security regimes for HSR trains in the european countries or in Japan. 
HSR trains are generally integrated with non-HSR trains, precluding separate security 
regimes. 
Screening passengers and luggage, even on a random basis, as practiced on some rail 
systems in the United States, generally has been rejected. 
european authorities see the greatest vulnerability in the crowded metro and subway 
stations and trains. european attitudes about the degree to which risk can be reduced 
differ from those of Americans. Instead of passenger screening, european rail systems 
rely on the presence of armed guards and extensive CCTV surveillance. Greater attention 
is given to designing security into new stations than to passenger screening.
5. What can be learned from Terrorist attacks on HSr?
MtI’s Database of terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against public Surface 
transportation shows only 33 terrorist attacks on HSR targets, and there are some 
interesting differences between attacks on HSR and those on non-HSR targets. 
the percentage of non-HSR attacks involving bombs is higher than that of HSR attacks, 
but the percentage of fatalities caused by bombs is lower. track bombs designed to cause 
derailments were far more frequent and far more lethal in HSR attacks than in non-HSR 
attacks. 
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the average fatalities per device (FpD) is higher for non-HSR targets (1.7) than for HSR 
targets (1.1). Despite that, the FpD of track bombs used against HSR targets is higher 
than that of track bombs used against non-HSR targets. the situation for passenger-
compartment bombs is dramatically reversed. the average FpD for these bombs 
against non-HSR targets is almost three times that of bombs placed in HSR passenger 
compartments. 
the overall lethality rate of terrorist attacks on HSR targets, measured in fatalities per 
attack, is significantly lower than that for attacks on non-HSR targets. 
these poor results, from the terrorists’ perspective, suggest that HSR is not likely to be 
the primary target of terrorists seeking high body counts. terrorists bent upon slaughter 
can more easily achieve their goal by attacking crowded subways and commuter trains, 
as they have done.
the results of a successful derailment of an HSR train could theoretically match those 
of a successful bombing of a crowded commuter train, but successful high-casualty 
HSR derailments are rare. only three of 11 attempted terrorist derailments of HSR trains 
succeeded, and only one derailment caused by terrorists resulted in casualties of that 
magnitude. (More details are provided in part II of this executive Summary.)
6. What can be learned from accidents Involving HSr?
Because of the fortunate paucity of attacks on HSR systems, our research was broadened 
to include data from accidents involving HSR, which could provide additional information 
about the possible consequences of potential future terrorist attacks and might also offer 
insights into such attacks. Might terrorists, for example, try to exploit vulnerabilities revealed 
by HSR accidents in an attempt to replicate them? Although this inquiry was not intended 
to result in conclusions about safety itself, some conclusions emerged.
there has been, on average, one accident in every three operating years in the 12 countries 
that have HSR and one fatal accident every 13 years—less than one fatality per operating 
year.
The overall average is 2.4 fatalities per accident; the median is less than 1. And 101 of 
the 167 fatalities occurred in a single accident in Germany, when a faulty wheel on a high-
speed train led to a disastrous derailment that hurled coaches into an abutment.
The most common accidents were collisions with vehicles at grade crossings—nine 
incidents, two of which resulted in train derailments and a total of nine fatalities (seven in 
the vehicles). 
the most lethal events, on average, were the derailments. of seven derailments, two 
were disasters. The one in Germany and one in China that resulted in 40 fatalities account 
for 91% of the fatalities. these two events, however, added to the two HSR derailments 
caused by terrorists in Russia, one of which killed 27 people and injured 95 and the other 
of which injured 60 people, may lead to terrorist perceptions that one way to achieve high 
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body counts is by derailing high-speed trains. this is what osama bin Laden may have 
had in mind when he urged followers to derail passenger trains in the United States. (More 
details on accidents are provided in part III of this executive Summary.)
7. Should HSr passengers go Through Security Screening?
Should all HSR passengers undergo screening like that of passengers boarding the 
eurostar, or should they board as other rail passengers do now?
there are a number of options for HSR security screening:
1. An aviation-security model that involves the rigorous screening of all HSR passengers 
and their carry-on baggage for weapons and explosives.
2. An option that might be called “aviation security lite,” such as a eurostar equivalent. 
In such a model, 100% of HSR passengers would be screened but would undergo 
a less-rigorous inspection. 
3. Subjecting HSR passengers to the same measures as those currently used for some 
non-HSR passengers. these include ID checks, explosives-detecting canines, and, 
most important, “selective” passenger screening in which passengers are randomly 
selected for voluntary screening. 
4. A purely theoretical but unlikely fourth option: the expansion of HSR systems in the 
United States could be the occasion for a fundamental reassessment of risk, leading 
to an overall reduction in all passenger rail security—for example, by eliminating 
any attempts at passenger screening.
Imposing an aviation-security model on HSR passengers would be difficult and is 
unnecessary. Very small quantities of explosives that can cause catastrophic airliner 
crashes if smuggled on board cannot derail a train or cause catastrophic train crashes. 
The same is true of firearms and other weapons. One can theoretically hijack a train, but 
one cannot crash it into the side of a skyscraper. Weapons pose a danger to passengers 
on board, but no more of a threat than that to persons at any other public venue. 
Adopting 100% screening would have implications not only for passengers and screeners 
but also for station design and construction, location of vendors at stations, even train 
schedules. Screening must be carried out not only at a train’s initial departure point but 
also at every stop along the entire route. this would require all boarding passengers to 
pass through checkpoints at some point. It also would require the physical isolation of HSR 
passengers from unscreened, non-HSR passengers.
All other entrants to the secure area would also have to be screened, and any security 
breaches would have to be resolved before boarding is permitted. In a rail system, this 
could cause delays along the entire route. 
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Maintaining a separate security regime for HSR passengers would impede the integration 
of HSR with other rail systems and transportation modes as well as the development of 
HSR trains as commuter rail. Conversely, the smooth integration of HSR with regional, 
commuter, and rail transit services in large terminals would make it more difficult to impose 
a separate security regime for HSR passengers. 
Imposing a robust passenger-screening regime would also undermine one of the major 
attractions of HSR, its convenience: trains run from city center to city center. there are 
no commutes to and from airports. passengers can easily bring their luggage on board. 
there are no security delays. And HSR trains can provide convenient connections with 
other modes of surface transportation without the need to change stations.
8. Would Increased Security for HSR Offer a Net Security Benefit to Public 
Surface Transportation?
With finite resources, authorities are obliged to make decisions about the allocation 
of security resources. Generally, such decisions address threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences. One additional criterion is whether providing security for a specific target or 
category of targets offers a net security benefit, that is, does it prevent terrorists from doing 
something that they cannot do elsewhere with equal ease and similar consequences? 
If the security measures have no effect other than obliging terrorists to select other public 
spaces where they can expect to achieve the same results, there is no net security benefit. 
For potential targets where the consequences of a successful attack could be catastrophic, 
pushing terrorists to softer targets where the consequences are likely to be less provides 
a net security benefit.
Unlike the situation in aviation, keeping weapons and bombs off HSR trains may do 
little more than shift terrorist sights to ordinary trains and subways, which are already 
well-established terrorist targets, or still other easily accessible targets outside of the 
transportation sector. that may be good news for HSR passengers, but it offers virtually 
no net security benefit to transportation users or society. 
9. Where Should HSr Security efforts be Focused?
the data do not support the hypothesis that HSR passengers are in greater danger from 
bombs smuggled on board high-speed trains than other passengers. Given the difficulty 
of maintaining a separate security regime for HSR passengers (to say nothing about 
sustaining the moral argument of treating HSR passengers as a special class), it may 
make more sense to treat all rail passengers as a single class, allocating security resources 
according to threat, not target category. this would mean putting the focus on the station 
rather than the train. 
Focusing on the station would match current security theory in europe and Japan, where 
HSR has become merely another component of an integrated passenger rail system. 
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If there is an area where HSR merits special attention, it is along the RoW, where terrorists 
have focused most of their action. only through derailments can terrorists hope to achieve 
the high body counts that have become a hallmark of contemporary terrorism. At the other 
end of the spectrum, disruption of HSR traffic by placing fake devices or obstacles on the 
tracks has become a mode of protest.
10. What are the principles of an HSr Security Strategy?
• HSR travel is safe. the most frequent sources of accidental casualties are 
pedestrians on the tracks and accidents at grade crossings. terrorists have attacked 
HSR targets, but not with the frequency or lethality of their attacks on subways and 
commuter trains.
• the construction of new HSR systems offers an opportunity to review rail security 
for all connecting rail transportation systems—the goal is passenger security, not 
just HSR passenger security. 
• Preventing attacks is difficult but not the only goal of security. Facilitating emergency 
response and rapid restoration of service should also be considered.
• Intelligence efforts have been critical in stopping terrorist plots, but they cannot foil 
every attempt. physical security measures offer some deterrent value. they can 
discourage some of the less-competent attackers and complicate planning for the 
higher-end terrorists. 
• Since HSR will be connected to non-HSR systems and in many systems is 
envisioned to function as high-speed commuter transit, separate, more-stringent 
security regimes for HSR will be the exception.
• Any special security measures adopted for HSR trains should provide a net security 
benefit, not merely displace the risk to non-HSR trains and passengers. 
• Security measures may focus on the station rather than a particular component 
of transportation in the station. New or renovated stations should be designed not 
only to facilitate security but also to accommodate future security environments, 
including temporary increases in security and developments in security technology.
• Security measures at stations and prior to boarding should anticipate heightened 
security situations. 
• Security resources should be allocated to save lives, not protect one category of 
trains or passengers.
• An aviation-security model of 100% passenger inspection does not appear feasible 
with today’s technology.
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• Random screening for both HSR and non-HSR passengers is used increasingly 
and appears generally acceptable. 
• the apparent propensity of terrorists to attack the rails of HSR lines suggests that 
rail security measures should be given close attention.
• Disruptions caused by objects on the tracks, false signals, and threats requiring 
inspections and patrolling also should be considered in security planning.
• Given the importance of train control and signaling in HSR systems, cyber security 
must also be given appropriate attention.
parT II—TerrorIST aTTacKS on HIgH-Speed raIl
An empirical examination of the MtI Database of Attacks on public Surface transportation 
between 1970 and 2012 reveals the following: (1) there were 33 attacks, in which 32 
people were killed, against HSR targets, including trains, tracks and infrastructure; twenty-
four (72.7%) of these attacks involved 29 IeDs, improvised incendiary devices, or other 
explosives, such as mines. Most of the devices were placed on a track or bridge, or in a 
tunnel. one of them, a 7- to 8-kg (15- to 18-lb) charge, caused the derailment of a high-
speed train in Russia, killing 27 people.
there are important differences between these attacks and the 1,510 devices used in 
1,283 attacks against non-HSR targets, which include all passenger trains (intercity, 
subway, etc.), stations, tracks, and other infrastructure. 
First, while the percentage of non-HSR attacks involving devices is slightly higher than 
for HSR attacks, they account for a much lower percentage of fatalities: 76.1% instead of 
100%. 
Second, comparing the percentage of devices placed on railway tracks, in tunnels, and on 
bridges to the percentage of those placed in the passenger compartment of trains reveals 
that track bombs account for 59% of all devices used against non-HSR targets and 76% 
for HSR targets, while the percentage of devices placed in passenger compartments is 
roughly the same. 
third, although the overall FpD for HSR attacks (1.1) is lower than that for non-HSR 
attacks (1.7), the lethality of HSR track bombs is higher (1.2 vs. 0.9); this lethality is slightly 
higher (9%) than the HSR average and much lower (47%) than the non-HSR average. 
the situation is strikingly different for passenger-compartment devices. In HSR attacks the 
FPD is 1.7, whereas it is 4.5 for non-HSR targets; while this is 54% higher than the HSR 
overall average, the non-HSR FpD is 165% higher than the overall average. 
Fourth, devices designed to cause derailments were used far more often in HSR attacks 
(33%) than in non-HSR attacks (8.9%), and they were considerably more lethal (accounting 
for 85% of the HSR fatalities, as opposed to 19%). 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
10 executive Summary
overall, the slightly lower lethality of HSR attacks relative to non-HSR attacks suggests 
that HSR may not be the primary target of terrorists seeking high body counts. However, 
they could detonate bombs in HSR stations or platforms or attempt HSR derailments, 
although the rigid coupling of HSR trains makes a successful derailment more difficult to 
achieve. In addition to focusing on stations, those charged with security should also focus 
on tracks and supporting infrastructure (electrical supply, overhead wires), where devices 
could be lethal, or the instruments of low-level attacks aimed at disrupting HSR systems.
parT III—HIgH-Speed raIl accIdenTS and THeIr SecurITy 
IMplIcaTIonS
Safety incidents on 12 HSR systems in Western europe, east Asia, and the United States 
reveal vulnerabilities and provide insights into to the possible consequences of terrorist 
attacks. of 73 HSR safety incidents, 35 resulted in injury or death to passengers, crew, or 
others. Seventeen resulted in one or more fatalities, for a total of 167 deaths. the two most 
deadly accidents caused 84% of the fatalities (101 and 40 deaths). 
Most of the accidents in HSR operations have involved obstructions on the RoW, with 
vehicular grade crossings topping the list. the remaining incidents most often involved 
equipment malfunctions attributed to flaws in the engineering and/or construction phases 
of rolling stock or infrastructure. Over time, the HSR industry has introduced and/or refined 
a wide array of safety features that have significantly reduced the number of injuries and 
fatalities and the amount of damage, particularly in comparison with other passenger train 
operations such as densely crowded commuter trains.
The design of an HSR trainset’s between-car connections plays the most significant role in 
the severity of an incident. the more a train, by design, stays linear and upright in a collision 
or derailment, the better the life-safety conditions. Steps to address crashworthiness have 
also improved safety. In the United States, all revenue equipment must be built to comply 
with Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) crashworthiness standards, which are typically 
much more stringent than those in other countries. 
Reducing the number of grade-crossings or completely eliminating them is the most 
significant step HSR operators can take to reduce collision hazards. The potential for 
vehicles, equipment, pedestrians and livestock to venture on to the RoW, outside of public 
crossings, must also be addressed. Advancements in isolating HSR RoW and installing 
systems to prevent and/or detect accidental or intentional intrusion not only reduce 
accidents but also enhance security measures, particularly in areas of critical vulnerability.
the HSR safety record in europe and Asia clearly reveals that high numbers of injuries 
and deaths occur when HSR trains collide with other trains or massive objects and that 
specific locations or design features of the infrastructure put rail passengers at greater risk 
of catastrophic consequences should an incident occur. However, these vulnerabilities are 
not unique to HSR. Intercity, commuter, and heavy rail all operate in the same or similar 
environments. Formulating a strategy for securing HSR in the United States, separate and 
apart from the rest of the passenger and even freight rail network, is not warranted solely 
because of the greater speed of HSR trains.
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As part of the Mineta transportation Institute’s (MtI’s) continuing research effort on high-
speed rail (HSR) security and safety, this report presents an analysis of information relating 
to attacks, attempted attacks, and plots against HSR systems. 
While terrorist attacks aimed at trains and buses have increased over the past several 
decades, very few attacks have targeted HSR. to gain possible insights into the 
consequences of successful terrorist attacks, this inquiry includes accidents and other 
incidents that have resulted in injuries, fatalities, or extensive asset damage on HSR. 
the consequences of major accidents might also affect terrorists’ perceptions and 
decisionmaking.
the authors reviewed security at selected HSR systems in europe and Japan to identify 
measures that could be applied to HSR systems currently under development in the United 
States. 
These three lines of inquiry—data from accidents, terrorist attacks, and existing security 
measures—are used in this report to develop an overall strategy for HSR security. 
objective of the research 
the objective of the research is not to dictate security regimes, but to:
• Distill lessons from the history of accidents and terrorist attacks
• Review security measures at existing HSR systems
• explore security-regime options
• Suggest principles for an overall security strategy
an empirical approach
the approach is empirical. the authors analyzed data on all attacks against HSR targets 
recorded in the MtI Database of terrorist and Serious Criminal Attacks Against public 
Surface transportation, beginning in 1970. they also analyzed HSR accident data to 
identify patterns in event types and outcomes, particularly lethality and injuries, damage, 
and service disruption. they sought to ascertain which events produced outcomes that 
would be attractive to a potential attacker and that terrorists might attempt to create or 
initiate.
the accident analysis focused on incidents since 1966 that occurred in the United States, 
Asia, and europe. Since that year, HSR systems have expanded rapidly, especially in 
europe, which currently hosts HSR operations that are well established and analogous to 
U.S. operations. 
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What is High-Speed rail?
High-speed rail is a malleable term. For the purpose of this inquiry, it comprises systems 
with the following characteristics:
• trains designed for sustained operation at or above 200 kph (125 mph)
• trains that provide service between population centers or urbanized areas, with 
limited interim stops
• trains that typically use semi-permanently connected sets of power cars, locomotives, 
and coaches of various configurations
• Rights-of-way (RoWs) that are grade-separated; that have limited, if any, level 
crossings with roads or other railroads; and that have access barriers
• trains that have dedicated-use RoWs, particularly outside of terminals
• trains that most often use overhead, constantly tensioned catenary to supply power 
to locomotives and power cars
• Systems that use some type of automatic train control (AtC) or positive train control 
(ptC) with line-side and cab signals
criteria for Incidents analyzed
Accidents, attacks, attempted attacks, and plots that involved HSR operations or equipment 
(either moving or stationary in a train station or in a storage or service yard) were defined 
as HSR incidents, attacks, or attempted attacks.
Accidents, attacks, or threats involving tracks or RoWs used exclusively by HSR trains 
were deemed HSR events.
Attacks or attempted attacks against RoWs that host HSR service along with other 
passenger and/or freight rail equipment/operations, unless their true intent or target choice 
was specifically identified as a non-HSR asset, were also classified as HSR events.
organization of the report
the report has three chapters. Chapter I discusses security measures abroad and offers 
security principles. Chapter II reviews terrorist attacks on HSR and their implications for 
security. Chapter III reviews HSR accidents and their implications for HSR security. In 
addition, Appendix A provides details of HSR incidents in europe, Asia, and the United 
States. Finally, Appendix B discusses current best security practices. 
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I. SecurITy prIncIpleS and MeaSureS
Almost any discussion of security causes many HSR proponents to bristle. they worry 
not only that mere mention of the issue will invite proposals for security regimes or heavy-
handed government edicts that will interfere with fast, convenient rail travel but that even 
talking about terrorist threats might somehow undermine campaigns to win support for 
new HSR systems. In their view, no one who writes about security can be trusted to do 
anything but cause trouble.
In fact, however, the subject of security need not create adversaries, and the right time to 
initiate a discussion is now, as new HSR systems are being designed and built. this report 
is intended to inform that discussion by addressing the following questions:
1. Does HSR merit more security or different security measures than other passenger 
rail?
2. Is it appropriate to consider reducing security for passenger rail?
3. What threats drive security concerns?
4. What can be learned from HSR security in europe and Japan?
5. What can be learned from terrorist attacks on HSR?
6. What can be learned from accidents involving HSR?
7. Should HSR passengers go through security screening?
8. Would increased security for HSR provide a net security benefit to public surface 
transportation?
9. Where should HSR security efforts be focused?
10. What are the principles of an HSR security strategy?
1. does HSr Merit More Security or different Security Measures than other 
passenger rail?
HSR creates opportunities to improve security. the history of rail security measures is 
similar to that of airport security. Most airports were designed and built before airline security 
became a major consideration. the system at airports today is the accumulation of four 
decades of security measures. Likewise, most railway stations were built decades before 
security became a major concern and had to be modified and retrofitted for security. For 
example, blast-resistant trash containers and lockers have been installed, bollards have 
been deployed, and structural changes have been made to prevent or reduce the effects of 
large vehicle bombs. HSR expansion in the United States will bring about the construction 
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of new stations, RoWs, and rolling stock and therefore represents an opportunity to design 
and build in security at the beginning. 
the fundamental question is, Does HSR merit more security or different security measures 
than those in place for non-HSR? Some argue that HSR merits more security, for a number 
of reasons:
• HSR is an iconic target, making it more attractive to terrorists than non-HSR.
• HSR is faster, so derailed high-speed trains would result in more casualties.
• HSR typically serves a customer base comprising the country’s government and 
business leaders. 
• the construction of HSR systems could provoke opposition from some members of 
local communities who might be tempted to take disruptive action.
Is HSR iconic? Visually and symbolically, HSR trains are much like the streamliners and 
famous named passenger trains of the 1930s and 1940s. In Europe and Asia, HSR is 
seen as iconic of both national identity and economic status—a symbol of technological 
achievement and national progress. But new Metro lines, such as those in Washington, 
Atlanta, Barcelona, and London (the Heathrow express), are also modern in looks and 
have an iconic quality. Furthermore, old stations, including New York’s Grand Central and 
Penn Stations, London’s Victoria Station, and Melbourne’s Flinders Street Station, as well 
as new ones like France’s Avignon Station, also have iconic value. As high-speed trains 
become more common and operate simply as faster commuter trains, their iconic premium 
will diminish.
HSR trains do go faster, but does higher velocity lead to greater casualties? Accident data 
from HSR offer a mixed picture—derailments can be disastrous, but the average number of 
casualties in the data is driven by just two incidents, one in Germany and one in China. And 
the majority of casualties in these incidents resulted from the design of the infrastructure. 
In Germany, the derailing train knocked out the supports for an overpass, and the falling 
concrete crushed train cars. In China, derailing cars fell 50 feet from a viaduct. other HSR 
derailments suggest that the rigid coupling of HSR trains impedes rolling over or jackknifing, 
two major causes of derailment casualties. In the realm of terrorism, one incident in Russia 
drives perceptions. In November 2009, saboteurs detonated an explosive charge under 
the Nevsky express that was powerful enough to blow one of the coaches into the air. 
twenty-seven persons were killed, and 95 were injured.
the fact that the Nevsky express was popular with Russian politicians and businessmen 
may have contributed to its being selected as a target. In addition to the November 2009 
attack, it was bombed in August 2007, with 60 people being injured. HSR trains often 
do carry an elite passenger load. Similarly, high-end hotels are selected as targets by 
terrorists for both their iconic value and the fact that they are gathering places for visiting 
and local elite. Again, however, this feature will diminish as HSR becomes more common 
and serves growing numbers of long-distance commuters.
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HSR construction projects may arouse new adversaries. Some HSR systems will face 
local opposition from those who may see fenced RoWs or roadbeds resting on multistory 
berms to create easy underpasses for vehicular traffic as threats to their local community. In 
europe, anarchists and malicious pranksters have disrupted HSR. A few extremists could 
carry out acts of sabotage during the HSR construction phase or subsequent operations.
these actions are likely to take the form of vandalism or low-level sabotage aimed at 
causing delay and disruption rather than death and destruction. Historical examples include 
objects placed on rails, grappling hooks that tear down catenary wires, and sabotage of 
power lines to the system. the security approach in the case of such incidents must be 
rapid response and restoration.
It can also be argued that HSR has characteristics that make it less attractive to terrorists. 
passenger loads on HSR trains, per car and per train, are typically less than those on 
slower-speed commuter or intercity trains, reducing the chances of replicating the high 
body counts achieved in the worst terrorist attacks on such systems.
Reservations and advance ticket sales for HSR travel create opportunities for identity 
checks. Unlike regional or commuter rail, HSR usually has all-reserved seating, which 
requires making an advanced booking. However, this practice may not be followed where 
HSR serves as commuter rail.
exclusive HSR RoWs, often fenced, reduce the vulnerability of the tracks to unauthorized 
intentional access and increase the chances of detection of sabotage. (exclusive RoWs, 
however, also may reduce train frequency, increasing exposure to sabotage.)
Hard roadbed and seamless rail construction make rail sabotage harder to conceal. Attacks 
on the French TGV in 1995 and two attacks on the Nevsky Express suggest that the high 
speed of the trains makes sabotage more difficult but not impossible.
2. Is it appropriate to consider reducing Security for passenger rail?
this seems like a radical question, but if the expansion of HSR offers an opportunity 
to examine security enhancements, it should also be an occasion to have a sensible 
discussion about risk to all rail passengers—HSR and non-HSR. Security should not 
become a ratchet where the current level becomes the norm and can only be increased.
Most security measures are aimed at deterring or preventing ordinary crime—pickpocketing, 
drunk or unruly passengers, armed assaults or robberies in stations or on board trains, 
people being pushed onto the tracks from platforms, suicides, turnstile-jumping, vandalism 
and other forms of property destruction, routine bomb threats. these measures will 
continue. Anticrime measures such as the visible presence of security personnel, closed-
circuit television (CCTV) coverage, suspicious-activity reporting, and stations designed to 
eliminate dim corners and narrow passageways where crimes may occur may also have 
some deterrent effect on terrorists. 
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Our focus here is on measures specifically intended to deter, detect, or prevent acts of 
terrorism—bombings, armed assault, arson, and attempts to derail trains or disrupt traffic. 
Antiterrorism security measures include the presence of more-heavily armed security 
personnel, explosives-detection canines, monitoring or detection systems for chemical 
or radiological materials, identity checks, passenger screening, and luggage inspection. 
these measures are associated with air travel, causing some to fear the imposition of 
aviation-style security on surface transportation, or at least high-speed trains. this last 
issue is discussed in detail under Question 7 below. 
In the past 40 years, only one person in the United States died as a consequence of a 
terrorist attack on a rail target—the 1995 derailment of the Sunset Limited. Nevertheless, 
the long-term increase in the number and lethality of terrorist attacks on trains and buses 
worldwide argues for continued antiterrorism security measures. Between 9/11 and 
December 31, 2012, 2,190 terrorist or serious criminal attacks were made against public 
surface transportation, resulting in 4,304 fatalities. Of these attacks, 870 were against rail 
targets, resulting in 1,362 fatalities.
In addition to those attacks, 15 terrorist plots that we know about against rail passengers 
either failed or were foiled by authorities. While most of these plots were interrupted in their 
early planning stages, they were intended to kill in quantity.
Just before his death, osama bin Laden was urging followers to carry out attacks on 
rail targets in the United States. He envisioned derailing speeding passenger trains. U.S. 
authorities uncovered five terrorist plots against rail targets, all of which were directed 
against passengers on subways or commuter trains. After devastating terrorist attacks on 
trains in Madrid in 2004, where 191 persons died, and London in 2005, where 52 persons 
died, and at least eight failed or foiled terrorist plots directed against rail since 9/11, europe 
has increased the presence of armed security personnel and CCTV coverage.
Just as it is hard to make the case that HSR requires more security than non-HSR, it is 
difficult to argue that HSR requires less security. An argument can be made that some of 
the security measures currently in place for all passenger rail are unnecessary, but that 
is an argument about rail security in general, not about the differences between HSR and 
non-HSR.
These circumstances make it difficult to argue for adopting a level of security for HSR that 
is lower than that for non-HSR or for lowering the overall level of security for all passenger 
rail systems. that does not prelude appropriate future reductions.
3. What Threats drive Security concerns?
Security for passenger rail is driven by both actual and anticipated events. Several 
scenarios cause concern:
• Improvised explosive devices (IeDs) detonated on board trains or at stations. the 
Madrid and London attacks and the 2006 bombing of a Mumbai commuter train, 
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which killed 207 people, are examples. Several of the terrorist plots interrupted in 
the United States envisioned the use of IeDs.
• An active shooter or multiple shooters on board a train or at stations. In 1993, six 
people were killed by a deranged gunman on board a Long Island commuter train, 
and in 2008, two terrorists opened fire on passengers at Mumbai’s Central Rail 
terminal, killing 56 people.
• Attempts to derail trains by sabotaging the tracks with IeDs, using mechanical 
means, or placing obstacles on the tracks. this is what osama bin Laden had in 
mind. the worst such case was the 2009 derailment of the Nevsky express, in 
which 27 people died.
• Disruption of traffic by attacking cables or signaling systems, bomb threats, or other 
means.
4. What can be learned from HSr Security in europe and Japan?
there are no international or regional standards of security for rail systems, either HSR or 
non-HSR. National operators of HSR systems impose their own security measures. the 
european Union (eU) sees a need for harmonization of security practices but is not close 
to regulation. the approach is likely to remain one of best practices selected by authorities 
and operators to meet local needs.
Industry organizations such as the International Union of public transport (UIpt) and the 
International Union of Railways (UIC) are in the process of reviewing security for passenger 
rail, but they are not likely to issue standards. the UItp is cataloging best practices for all 
passenger rail systems. 
HSR Security in Europe
Special security measures are in effect for the eurostar, the high-speed trains that run 
between London and paris and Brussels. these measures preceded 9/11 and initially 
reflected concerns about the terrorist campaign being conducted by the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), which was active in the United Kingdom (UK) during the construction of the 
tunnel under the english Channel.
While security of the train and tunnel were priority concerns, preventing illegal immigration 
to the UK is also an important concern, and the eurostar crosses the France-UK border. 
the UK is not a member of the Schengen Agreement, which allows free circulation across 
borders within the Schengen space, and is determined to prevent illegal immigration from 
countries on the continent.
the French terminal for the eurostar, the Gare du Nord, has dedicated platforms for it. 
these are separated from the station’s other platforms by glass walls and high metallic 
fences. eurostar passengers enter through a special entrance inside the station, where 
luggage is x-rayed and passengers are screened. the screening is much like pre-9/11 
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airport security: passengers do not have to remove their shoes, may carry unlimited 
quantities of liquids and gels, and do not pass through body scanners.
passport control and customs inspections, both French and British, are completed at the 
boarding station so that upon arrival, passengers merely disembark. It is recommended 
that passengers arrive at the station 45 minutes before scheduled departure to complete 
these procedures.
Similar measures are in effect at the Gare du Midi in Brussels, the other eurostar terminus 
on the continent, and at St. pancras Station in London, the British terminus. tickets can 
be purchased at these stations before departure, but this does not guarantee a reserved 
seat on the train desired. that requires advance booking. 
the eurostar is unique in that it is the only HSR train in europe to have special security 
measures. All other high-speed trains are treated the same as other passenger trains—
there is no passenger or luggage screening or other security checks, even for cross-border 
trains, although random ticket or ID checks can occur on board some trains. Countries 
within the Schengen space operate on the principle of free circulation and reflect the general 
attitude that without new technologies that currently do not exist, any form of passenger 
screening would onerously delay travel times and, given current threat assessments, are 
unwarranted. 
The emphasis in European HSR is on convenience. In France, passengers on HSR (TGV) 
trains have to check in only two minutes before departure. on other trains, passengers 
merely need to be on board before the doors close.
Some HSR trains in Spain have security measures. passengers on long-distance high-
speed trains must have their ID confirmed, and their baggage is scanned. Selected 
passengers may be subjected to a personal search. Spain also has ticket controls at the 
platform entrance. Still, passengers may arrive only minutes before departure without fear 
of missing the train. Both armed police and private security guards patrol regional and 
commuter trains in Spain.
German authorities have not mandated passenger or luggage screening for HSR trains. 
Germany has no dedicated high-speed corridors or platforms, so HSR is fully integrated 
into the national rail system, making it virtually impossible to separate HSR from non-HSR 
passengers. German authorities also point out that the high-volume metro systems, not 
the longer-distance trains, cause the greatest security concern. Germany relies primarily 
on surveillance, utilizing both uniformed guards and CCTV at train stations.
Following the terrorist bomb attacks on London’s tube in 2005, officials at the British 
Department of transport carried out trials to test the feasibility of mass passenger screening. 
they found that while riders were generally positive about the need for security, they were 
unwilling to accept major delays or the loss of privacy that came with screening. Despite 
the continuing high terrorist threat level, the Department of transport concluded in 2008 
that airport-style screening of all rail and underground passengers was not possible with 
the technology then available.
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In 2012, Britain’s Home Office initiated a search for new and emerging technologies capable 
of rapidly screening large numbers of passengers. If such technologies were available, they 
could be deployed at major train and tube stations, with no special regime for HSR trains 
other than the existing measures in place to protect the eurostar. the technology would 
be used to detect explosives, guns, and knives being carried by passengers themselves 
or in their bags. However, the Home Office indicated that the screening must be achieved 
without imposing any delay. technologies to detect chemical and biological substances 
are also being sought.
New stations such as the station in Avignon, France, and the stations along the new Meteor 
Metro line in paris, are designed to facilitate surveillance. they have open spaces, have 
no dim corners, and are well lit. European countries—in particular, the UK, France, and 
Germany—make extensive use of CCTV. Armed police are deployed at train and subway 
stations and on the trains. 
As for track security, HSR RoWs are fenced along their entire length. Level crossings are 
not permitted. Bridges over the lines have sensors to detect objects that fall or that may 
be thrown onto the tracks. In the 1990s in France, early-morning sweeper trains were 
dispatched before passenger traffic began.
HSR Security in Japan 
there are no screening procedures for passengers boarding high-speed or other trains in 
Japan. After the 1995 sarin attacks on Tokyo’s subways, CCTV surveillance was increased 
and surveillance cameras were installed on board trains to keep passengers “feeling 
secure.”
Summary
there are no international standards for HSR trains, although common standards for rail 
security are being discussed in the eU. With the exception of the eurostar and longer-
distance trains in Spain, there are no separate security regimes for HSR trains in the 
european countries reviewed for this study or in Japan. HSR trains are generally integrated 
with non-HSR trains, precluding separate security regimes. 
Screening passengers and luggage, even on a random basis, as practiced on some rail 
systems in the United States, has been rejected in europe, despite the attacks in Madrid 
and London and other terrorist plots that have been uncovered. there is no passenger 
screening in Japan. 
the absence of security delays is viewed as a major attraction of rail travel. european 
authorities see the greatest vulnerability in the crowded metro and subway stations and 
trains. Despite a higher terrorist threat level, european attitudes about the degree to which 
risk can be reduced differ from those of Americans. Instead of passenger screening, 
European rail systems rely on the presence of armed guards and extensive CCTV 
surveillance. Greater attention is given to designing security into new stations than to 
passenger screening.
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5. What can be learned from Terrorist attacks on HSr?
According to the MtI Database of Attacks on Surface transportation, through 2012, 33 
terrorist attacks had been made on HSR targets, which include HSR trains and the tracks 
and other infrastructure they use, all but one in europe.
Although european countries have suffered terrorist campaigns, including deadly attacks 
on passenger rail targets, for the most part, terrorism in europe has not matched the 
volume or high lethality of terrorist attacks in India, pakistan, or Israel. the exception is 
Russia, where terrorist attacks have resulted in large numbers of fatalities; a total of 32 
persons in Russia have been killed in terrorist attacks on HSR.
twenty-four of the 33 attacks (72.7%) involved bombs, but only three of the 29 IeDs, other 
bombs, or improvised incendiary devices (IIDs)1 used in these 24 attacks were carried 
on board and placed in passenger compartments. One of these resulted in five fatalities. 
twenty-two (75.9%) of the bombs were placed on a track, a bridge, or near a tunnel. one 
of them, a 7- to 8-kg (15- to 18-lb) charge, caused the derailment of the Nevsky express. 
None of the other attacks resulted in fatalities.
there are some interesting differences between terrorist attacks on HSR and those on 
non-HSR targets. the non-HSR targets in this analysis included passenger trains (subway 
trains, intercity or commuter trains, etc.), train stations, tracks, and other infrastructure to 
ensure an accurate comparison with HSR attacks.2 
the percentage of non-HSR attacks involving bombs is higher than that of HSR attacks, 
but the percentage of fatalities caused by bombs is lower. A total of 1,283 attacks against 
non-HSR targets killed 3,277 people. of these attacks, 1,090 (85%) involved a total of 
1,510 bombs (compared with 72.7% for HSR targets). Attacks involving bombs killed 
2,495 people, or 76.1% of the total. By comparison, all of the fatalities in HSR attacks 
were caused by bombs.
We compared the largest category of bomb attacks placed in the passenger compartment 
recorded in the MtI database (“Concealed or placed in passenger Compartment, 
Unspecified,” which we refer to as passenger-compartment bombs), with the placement 
of bombs in or on railway tracks, tunnels, or bridges (which we refer to as track bombs).
the percentage of track bombs in non-HSR attacks was 58.9% (890 out of 1,510 devices); 
in HSR attacks, the percentage was much higher, 75.9% (22 out of 29 devices). By 
comparison, the percentage of passenger-compartment bombs was roughly the same: 
11.5% (173 out of 1,510 devices) for non-HSR attacks and 10.3% (3 out of 29 devices) for 
HSR attacks.
track bombs designed to cause derailments were far more frequent and far more lethal 
in HSR attacks than in non-HSR attacks. Eight (33.3%) of the 24 bomb attacks against 
HSR targets were designed to cause derailments, and they resulted in 27 (84.4%) of the 
1 In this report, the term bomb refers collectively to IeDs, IIDs, mines, dynamite, and other explosives.
2 While attacks have been made against the outside and inside areas of non-HSR stations, there have 
been none—so far —against stations in HSR transportation.
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32 fatalities. By comparison, only 97 (8.9%) of the 1,090 bomb attacks against non-HSR 
targets were designed to cause derailments, and they caused only 475 (19.0%) of the 
2,495 fatalities.
Finally, there are considerable differences between the numbers and lethality of track 
bombs and passenger-compartment bombs for HSR and non-HSR targets. the numbers 
of fatalities per device (FpD) are shown in table 1.
Table 1. Fatalities per device in HSr and non-HSr bomb attacks
category all HSr attacks all non-HSr attacks
all bomb attacks
total # of Devices in Bomb Attacks 29 1,510
overal Fatalities per Device (FpD) 1.1 FpD 1.7 FpD
bombs on Tracks
# of track Bombs (% of All HSR or Non-HSR Bombs) 22 (75.9%) 890 (58.9%)
FpD of All HSR/Non-HSR track Bombs 1.2 FpD 0.9 FpD
Greater/Less than overall FpD 0.1 FpD higher (9.1%) 0.8 FPD lower (47.1%)
bombs in passenger compartment
#/% of All passenger Compartment Bombs 3 (10.3%) 173 (11.5%)
FpD of All passenger Compartment Bombs 1.7 FpD 4.5 FPD
Greater/Less than overall FpD 0.6 FPD higher (54.5%) 2.8 FPD higher (164.7% higher)
the average FpD is higher for non-HSR targets (1.7) than for HSR targets (1.1). Despite 
that, the FpD of track bombs used against HSR targets is actually higher (1.2) than that 
of track bombs used against non-HSR targets (0.9) and is higher for HSR targets (9.1%) 
than the overall average; for non-HSR targets, it is 47.1% lower. 
the situation for passenger-compartment bombs is reversed, and dramatically. the 
average FpD for these bombs against HSR targets is 1.7, whereas against non-HSR 
targets, it is 4.5. The FPD for passenger-compartment bombs was 54.5% higher than the 
overall average for HSR attacks, but the comparable increase for non-HSR attacks was 
164.7%.
the overall lethality rate of terrorist attacks on HSR targets, measured in fatalities per 
attack and FPD, is significantly lower than that for attacks on non-HSR targets. There were 
only 1.0 fatalities per attack on HSR targets, including the deadly derailment in Russia, 
and only 0.15 fatalities per attack, excluding the Russian derailment; the comparable FpD 
values are 1.1 and 0.17. For non-HSR targets, there were 2.6 fatalities per attack and 1.7 
FpD. 
these poor results, from the terrorists’ perspective, suggest that HSR is not likely to be 
the primary target of terrorists seeking high body counts. terrorists bent upon slaughter 
can more easily achieve their goal by attacking crowded subways and commuter trains, 
as they have done, although they could try to benefit from the iconic value of HSR by 
detonating bombs in HSR stations or on HSR platforms. (In some cases, densely packed 
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passengers may absorb some of the effects of a bomb blast, reducing the total number of 
casualties.)
the results of a successful derailment of an HSR train could theoretically match those of 
a successful bombing of a crowded commuter train, but as indicated previously, because 
of the rigid coupling of HSR trainsets, high-casualty HSR derailments are rare. only two 
accidental HSR derailments and one derailment caused by terrorists have resulted in 
casualties of that magnitude. only three of 11 attempted terrorist derailments of HSR trains 
succeeded. this suggests that security measures should focus on tracks and stations. 
And, as shown above, track bombs used against HSR targets are more lethal in absolute 
and relative terms than those used against non-HSR targets, and derailment attempts 
against HSR trains have so far been far more lethal than those against non-HSR trains.
Officials charged with security should not focus exclusively on Madrid and Nevsky 
express spectaculars and ignore lower-level threats. the latter are more likely to come 
from anarchists, local opponents of HSR construction, even pranksters, whose actions are 
likely to be aimed not at causing casualties but at blocking HSR projects and disrupting 
operations. leDs or fake IeDs, IIDs, and arson attempts and threats may support extortion 
attempts.
the most likely targets are tracks and supporting infrastructure (electrical supply, overhead 
wires, and obstacles on tracks). Prevention is difficult. Rail systems will need contingency 
planning and resiliency leading to rapid restoration of service.
6. What can be learned from accidents Involving HSr?
Because of the fortunate paucity of attacks on HSR systems, our research was broadened 
to include data from accidents involving HSR, which could provide additional information 
about the possible consequences of potential future terrorist attacks and might also offer 
insights into such attacks. Might terrorists, for example, try to exploit vulnerabilities revealed 
by HSR accidents in an attempt to replicate them? this inquiry was not intended to result 
in conclusions about safety itself. Nevertheless, some conclusions emerged.
We examined available accident data for HSR systems in 12 countries. those data may 
not be complete, but they capture the major incidents. 
We identified a total of 73 accidents, which resulted in 167 fatalities. While any death 
is tragic, these numbers indicate that HSR is safe. there has been, on average, one 
accident in every three operating years in the 12 countries and one fatal accident every 13 
years—less than one fatality per operating year.
Seventeen of the 73 accidents resulted in fatalities. these include three suicides and seven 
motorists or automobile passengers struck at grade crossings. (Data on pedestrians killed 
on the tracks were unavailable.) In addition, there was one case of a passenger falling or 
jumping from a train. 
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The overall average is 2.4 fatalities per accident; the median is less than 1. And 101 of 
the 167 fatalities occurred in a single accident in Germany, when a faulty wheel on a high-
speed train led to a disastrous derailment that hurled coaches into an abutment.
The most common accidents were collisions with vehicles at grade crossings—nine 
incidents, two of which resulted in train derailments and a total of nine fatalities (seven in 
the vehicles). 
the most lethal events, on average, were the derailments. of seven derailments, two 
were disasters. The one in Germany and one in China that resulted in 40 fatalities account 
for 91% of the fatalities. these two events, however, added to the two HSR derailments 
caused by terrorists in Russia, one of which killed 27 people and injured 95 and the other 
of which injured 60 people, may lead to terrorist perceptions that one way to achieve high 
body counts is by derailing high-speed trains. this is what osama bin Laden may have 
had in mind when he urged followers to derail passenger trains in the United States.
7. Should HSr passengers go Through Security Screening?
passenger screening is the most controversial aspect of security. Should all HSR 
passengers undergo screening like that of passengers boarding the eurostar, or should 
they board as other rail passengers do now?
there are a number of options for HSR security screening.
1. An aviation-security model that involves the rigorous screening of all HSR 
passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons and explosives.
2. An option that might be called “aviation security lite,” such as a eurostar equivalent. 
In such a model, 100% of HSR passengers would be screened but would undergo 
a less-rigorous inspection. they would pass through a metal detector, and carry-
on luggage would be x-rayed, but they would not have to remove shoes, belts, 
or jackets—roughly the equivalent of the Transportation Security Administration’s 
(tSA’s) preCheck regime, recently introduced at some U.S. airports, where trusted 
travelers are permitted to pass through a lighter security inspection. (It should 
be noted that since the amount of explosives that can cause a catastrophic loss 
of a train is significantly greater than the amount that can bring down an airliner, 
satisfactory detection rates could be achieved with far greater throughput.)
3. Subjecting HSR passengers to the same measures as those currently used for 
some non-HSR passengers. these include ID checks, explosives-detecting 
canines, and, most important, “selective” passenger screening in which passengers 
are randomly selected for voluntary screening, giving authorities using uniformed 
and undercover officers the chance to observe passengers who attempt to avoid 
screening rather than just objecting to it. 
4. A purely theoretical but unlikely fourth option: the expansion of HSR systems 
in the United States could be the occasion for a fundamental reassessment of 
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risk, leading to an overall reduction in all passenger rail security—for example, by 
eliminating any attempts at passenger screening.
Screening 100% of passengers seems unnecessary, impractical, and inadvisable. Imposing 
an aviation-security model on HSR passengers would be difficult and is unnecessary. Any 
passenger-screening model must start with what needs to be prevented.
Very small quantities of explosives that can cause catastrophic airliner crashes if smuggled 
on board cannot derail a train or cause catastrophic train crashes. passenger screening 
for rail would involve looking for significantly larger quantities, thus facilitating the search. 
(the exact quantities are still a topic of research.) 
The same is true of firearms and other weapons. One can theoretically hijack a train but 
cannot crash it into the side of a skyscraper. (tSA has recently relaxed its restrictions on 
small knives and certain other objects.) Weapons pose a danger to passengers on board, 
but no more of a threat than that to persons at any other public venue. Rail systems now 
prohibit passengers from carrying certain items on board, including weapons. (It is not 
certain how these rules apply in states in the United States where carrying concealed 
weapons is authorized.)
Adopting 100% screening would have implications not only for passengers and screeners 
but also for station design and construction, location of vendors at stations, even train 
schedules.
Screening must be carried out not only at a train’s initial departure point but also at every 
stop along the entire route. this would require all boarding passengers to pass through 
checkpoints single file at some point. It also would require the physical isolation of HSR 
passengers from unscreened, non-HSR passengers—a separate platform for HSR 
boarding would have to remain a sterile area. Station design would have to provide for this.
Since stops at stations along routes are brief, passengers would have to be screened in 
advance and held in a secure area, then allowed to board quickly, or stop times would 
have to be lengthened—last-minute boarding would become impractical.
All other entrants to the secure area would also have to be screened, and any security 
breeches would have to be resolved before boarding is permitted. In a rail system, this 
could cause delays along the entire route. In the case of a security breach, either the train 
would have to leave the affected station without boarding passengers, leaving them to find 
space on the next train, or the entire system would come to a halt.
Maintaining a separate security regime for HSR passengers would impede its integration 
with other rail systems and transportation modes as well as the development of HSR trains 
as commuter rail. Conversely, the smooth integration of HSR with regional, commuter, and 
rail transit services in large terminals would make it more difficult to impose a separate 
security regime for HSR passengers. Instead of treating HSR passengers as a special 
category for security, it may be preferable to look at the security of the entire station. 
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Security screening theoretically may be practical for longer-distance, point-to-point travel 
with no or very few intermediate stops (e.g., London to paris on the eurostar), but it would 
be difficult to impose on high-speed commuter trains with multiple stops (such as the U.S. 
Acela trains).
Imposing a robust passenger-screening regime would also undermine one of the major 
attractions of HSR, its convenience:
• trains run from city center to city center. there are no lengthy commutes to and 
from airports.
• passengers can easily bring their luggage on board.
• there are no security delays. passengers can arrive at a train station closer to 
departure time.
• there are no or few onerous security measures (e.g., no passenger screening). 
Passengers can keep their shoes and jackets on—a contentious issue in the United 
States.
• Roomier coaches provide the ability to walk around.
• HSR trains can provide convenient connections with other modes of surface 
transportation, including local trains and subways, without changing stations.
8. Would Increased Security for HSR Offer a Net Security Benefit to Public 
Surface Transportation?
Terrorists always have an advantage. Unlike armies, they do not have to attack specific 
targets of military value within a limited time frame. Unlike ordinary criminals, they do not 
have to go where the money is. terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time.
With finite resources, governments cannot protect everything, everywhere, all the time. 
Authorities are obliged to make decisions about the allocation of security resources. 
Generally, such decisions take into account the threat—the capabilities, intentions, and 
past actions of the likely terrorist adversaries; vulnerability—the targets that fall within the 
range of the terrorists’ capabilities; and consequences—what could happen if a terrorist 
attack is successful.
One additional criterion is whether providing security for a specific target or category of 
targets offers a net security benefit, that is, does it prevent terrorists from doing something 
that they cannot do elsewhere with equal ease and consequences? 
It is especially difficult to obtain a net security benefit by protecting public places—shopping 
malls, tourist sites, or crowded public squares, for example. protecting public places is 
difficult and costly. If the security measures have no effect other than obliging terrorists to 
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select other public spaces where they can expect to achieve the same results, there is no 
net security benefit.
Security works in that terrorists generally avoid well-defended targets. Security, however, 
does not prevent determined terrorists from carrying out an attack. It more often merely 
displaces the planned attack to a less-protected target.
this is another fundamental difference between terrorism and ordinary crime. pickpocketing, 
robberies, assaults, vandalism, and disorderly behavior are ordinary crimes that occur at 
transportation hubs and on board trains. perpetrators are numerous, but they have little 
determination. ordinary crimes can be reduced through environmental design. terrorists 
are comparatively rare, but they are more determined. Committed to action, they are not 
so easily deterred. Denied one target, they will often find another.
For potential targets where the consequences of a successful attack could be catastrophic, 
it is worthwhile to push terrorists to softer targets where the consequences are likely to be 
less. The reduction in potential consequences provides a net security benefit.
Aviation security and public surface transportation security illustrate the point. terrorists 
remain obsessed with attacking airliners, where successful sabotage can cause hundreds 
of fatalities, while successful hijackings, as the 9/11 attacks demonstrated, can result in 
thousands of deaths and hundreds of billions of dollars in destruction and the resulting 
loss of business. therefore, keeping explosives and other weapons off aircraft offers a net 
security benefit.
terrorists also attack trains and buses, but the number of fatalities in the bloodiest attacks 
has been around 200 (191 in the 2004 Madrid attack and 207 in the 2006 Mumbai attack)—
clearly lower than the numbers in the worst attacks on aviation. the same differences 
show up when the average or median numbers of casualties are compared.
this is not to say that terrorists, unable to blow up airplanes, blow up trains instead. there 
is not a direct tradeoff. Unable to get at airliners, terrorists have sometimes attacked 
airports. Buses and trains have become killing fields, reflecting terrorists’ determination 
to kill in quantity and willingness to kill indiscriminately. If body count is the terrorists’ 
paramount objective, trains and buses make excellent targets. they are easily accessible 
public places offering crowds of people in confined spaces.
Unlike the situation in aviation, keeping weapons and bombs off HSR trains may do 
little more than shift terrorist sights to ordinary trains and subways, which are already 
well-established terrorist targets, or still other easily accessible targets outside of the 
transportation sector. that may be good news for HSR passengers, but it offers virtually 
no net security benefit to transportation users or society. Tighter security for HSR, if it only 
displaces risk to non-HSR, provides no net security benefit.
History, ownership, jurisdictions, and politics cause us to compartmentalize targets, 
seeing them as isolated entities. Some compartmentalization is necessary—it is difficult to 
evaluate tradeoffs between increasing rail security and reducing infant deaths or buying a 
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new Navy warship. But viewing passenger rail transportation as a security domain makes 
sense. there is less certainty about treating HSR as a separate domain within it.
9. Where Should HSr Security efforts be Focused?
the historical record of attacks against HSR targets is sparse; some of the 33 attacks 
were related to a single campaign aimed at disruption—not enough for confident statistical 
analysis. Nonetheless, the data that do exist do not support the hypothesis that HSR 
passengers are in greater danger from bombs smuggled on board high-speed trains than 
other passengers. Indeed, the record suggests that HSR may be less of a target. Given 
the difficulty of maintaining a separate security regime for HSR passengers (to say nothing 
about sustaining the moral argument of treating HSR passengers as a special class), it 
may make more sense to treat all rail passengers as a single class, allocating security 
resources according to threat, not target category. this would mean putting the focus on 
the station rather than the train. 
Focusing on the station would match current security theory in europe and Japan, where 
HSR has become merely another component of an integrated passenger rail system. 
Stations are designed to discourage ordinary crime; to provide some level of deterrence 
to terrorists by facilitating surveillance and domain awareness; and to mitigate the 
consequences of terrorist bombings by eliminating or strengthening places where bombs 
could be easily hidden, such as lockers and trash bins, and by creating large open spaces 
where blast effects would be more easily vented. Stations in newer systems, including 
Washington DC’s Metro and the Meteor line in Paris, reflect some of these new design 
features.
Stations are also where regimes of selective passenger screening could be implemented 
and directed at HSR passengers as well as non-HSR passengers. Selective screening 
is one of the options mentioned above. Random passenger screening can be expanded 
to screen more passengers and can be easily reduced in accordance with the threat; the 
specific search protocols can also be adjusted. 
If there is an area where HSR merits special attention, it is along the RoW. this is where 
terrorists have focused most of their action, planting bombs or using mechanical means to 
cause derailments or to simply disrupt traffic. Only through derailments can terrorists hope 
to achieve the high body counts that have become a hallmark of contemporary terrorism. 
At the other end of the spectrum, disruption of HSR traffic by planting fake devices or 
simply placing obstacles has become a mode of protest.
Surveillance along long lines is always a challenge. tamper-detection systems are part 
of the rails themselves. Sweeper trains or their miniature equivalents can precede HSR 
traffic to ensure that the line is safe. Even small drones could be programmed to provide 
aerial surveillance of tracks and power lines. 
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10. What are the principles of an HSr Security Strategy?
• our analysis of accidents and terrorist attacks indicates that HSR travel is very safe. 
the most frequent sources of casualties are pedestrians on the tracks and accidents 
at grade crossings. these can be reduced. terrorists have attacked HSR targets, 
but not with the frequency or lethality of their attacks on subways and commuter 
trains.
• the construction of new HSR systems should be viewed as an opportunity to review 
rail security for all connecting rail transportation systems—the goal is passenger 
security, not just HSR passenger security. Appendix B describes current best 
security practices. 
• Preventing attacks is difficult, but it is not the only goal of security. Facilitating 
emergency response and rapid restoration of service should also be considered 
security goals.
• A review of failed and foiled terrorist plots suggests that intelligence efforts have 
been critical in stopping terrorist plots, but intelligence efforts alone clearly cannot foil 
every terrorist attempt. physical security measures offer some deterrent value and 
can undeniably stop some of the less-competent attackers. they also complicate 
planning for the higher-end terrorists, which, in turn, may increase their exposure to 
intelligence efforts. 
• Since HSR will be connected to non-HSR systems, and in many systems is 
envisioned to function as high-speed commuter transit, separate, more-stringent 
security regimes for HSR will be the exception, if they exist at all, rather than the 
rule, and will be limited to longer-distance point-to-point trains.
• Any special security measures adopted exclusively for HSR trains should provide a 
net security benefit, not merely displace the risk to non-HSR trains and passengers. 
this will be hard to achieve.
• Security measures may focus on the station rather than a particular component of 
transportation in the station. New or renovated stations should be designed and 
constructed not only to facilitate security in general but also to accommodate future 
security environments, including temporary increases in security resulting from 
developments in security technology, to the extent that these can be forecast—for 
example, improvements in “stand-off” explosives detection.
• Security measures at stations and prior to boarding should anticipate heightened 
security situations, including the need to selectively screen more passengers. the 
measures should be just as easy to lower.
• Security resources should be allocated to save lives, not protect one category of 
trains or passengers.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
29
Security principles and Measures
• An aviation-security model of 100% passenger inspection does not appear feasible 
with today’s available technology.
• Random screening for both HSR and non-HSR passengers is used increasingly and 
appears generally acceptable. It also can be increased and decreased, depending 
on the threat environment.
• the apparent propensity of terrorists to attack the rails of HSR lines, hoping to 
cause disastrous derailments, suggests that rail security measures should be given 
close attention.
• While security measures are understandably driven by the bloodiest incidents, 
disruptions caused by objects on the tracks, false signals (red flares), and threats 
(accompanied by real or hoax devices to establish credibility) requiring inspections 
and patrolling also should be considered in security planning.
• Given the importance of train control and signaling in HSR systems, cyber security 
must also be given appropriate attention. 
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II. TerrorIST aTTacKS on HIgH-Speed raIl
All but one of the 33 attacks on HSR systems recorded in the MtI Database of terrorist 
and Serious Criminal Attacks on public Surface transportation occurred in countries where 
HSR is most highly developed—32 in europe and one in Japan (see table 2). However, the 
countries that account for the greatest number of terrorist attacks on surface transportation 
are India and pakistan. of course, this is too tiny a universe to allow statistical analysis. 
Nonetheless, the data suggest some patterns.
Table 2. HSr attacks, by country
country # attacks % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpa
Median 
Fpa
avg 
Ipa
Median 
Ipa
Germany 10 30.3% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
France 9 27.3% 5 37 0.6 0.0 4.1 0.0
Spain 6 18.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Russian Federation 3 9.1% 27 155 9.0 0.0 51.7 0.0
United Kingdom 2 6.1% 0 1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Switzerland 1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Japan 1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Italy 1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 33 100.0% 32 193 1.0 0.0 5.8 0.0
table 3 shows that 19 of the 33 attacks targeted high-speed trains; nine targeted the 
railway tracks, but this is a bit misleading, since 11 of the 19 attacks were attempts to derail 
the trains by sabotaging the rails. the nine attacks listed in table 3 as targeting the railway 
tracks were not clearly intended to derail a train; they may have been intended simply to 
cause damage or disrupt service.
Table 3. HSr attacks, by Target
Target # attacks % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpa
Median 
Fpa
avg 
Ipa
Median 
Ipa
train, passenger 
(Intercity of Commuter)
19 57.6% 32 193 1.7 0.0 10.2 0.0
Railway tracks 9 27.3% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
train Service Facility or 
equipment
2 6.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Railway Signals or Comm. 
System
2 6.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Railway tunnel 1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 33 100.0% 32 193 1.0 0.0 5.8 0.0
This becomes clearer in Tables 4 and 5. As shown in Table 4, a total of 11 attacks were 
aimed at causing a derailment using an IeD or mechanical means. Nine other attempts 
involved bombs or IeDs; seven involved IIDs; three involved arson. table 5 provides a 
breakdown of derailment attempts.
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Table 4. HSr attacks, by attack Method
attack Method # attacks % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpa
Median 
Fpa
avg 
Ipa
Median 
Ipa
IED, Unspecified 9 27.3% 5 37 0.6 0.0 4.1 0.0
IID (Improvised Incendiary 
Device)
7 21.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Confirmed Track 
Bomb - IED, Unspecified
7 21.2% 27 155 3.9 0.0 22.1 0.0
Sabotage, other 3 9.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Arson 3 9.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Suspected track 
Bomb - IED, Unspecified
1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Suspected 
Bolts/tracks Removed
1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, other or Unknown 1 3.0% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Confirmed 
Bolts/tracks Removed
1 3.0% 0 1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 33 100.0% 32 193 1.0 0.0 5.8 0.0
Table 5. HSr attacks, by derailment Method
derailment attack Method # attacks % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpa
Median 
Fpa
avg 
Ipa
Median 
Ipa
Derailment, Confirmed Track 
Bomb - IED, Unspecified
7 63.6% 27 155 3.9 0.0 22.1 0.0
Derailment, Suspected track 
Bomb - IED, Unspecified
1 9.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Suspected 
Bolts/tracks Removed
1 9.1% 0 0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Derailment, Confirmed 
Bolts/tracks Removed
1 9.1% 0 1 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Derailment, other or Unknown 1 9.1% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 11 100.0% 27 156 2.5 0.0 14.2 0.0
only one of the attacks aimed at derailment resulted in fatalities as well as injuries; however, 
it accounted for the majority of the fatalities suffered in all the HSR attacks, and two more 
caused injuries. It appears that 10 of all the 33 attacks (and possibly a couple more) were 
intended to cause casualties, while 19 clearly were not. No judgment can be made in two 
cases. 
table 5 shows that bombs were the terrorists’ preferred way to derail a train, but of the 
11 attempts, only one succeeded in causing fatalities (the 2009 derailment of the Nevsky 
express). this was the second attempt on the same route. In 2007, terrorists derailed the 
Nevsky express by detonating a bomb just before a bridge. the bomb exploded under the 
locomotive, knocking it off the tracks, but the train stayed on the roadbed thanks to the 
flange rails on the bridge. No one died in the 2007 attack, but 60 people were injured. In 
2009, the attackers used a much larger explosive charge which hurled a coach into the air, 
derailing the cars that followed.
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Table 6 looks specifically at the 24 bomb attacks. Fifteen were aimed at high-speed trains, 
eight at railway tracks or tunnels.
Table 6. HSr bomb attacks, by Target
Target # attacks % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpd
Median 
Fpd
avg 
Ipd
Median 
Ipd
train, passenger 
(Intercity or Commuter)
15 62.5% 32 192 2.1 0.0 12.8 0.0
Railway tracks 7 29.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Railway tunnel 1 4.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Railway Signals or Comm. 
System
1 4.2% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 24 100.0% 32 192 1.1 0.0 6.6 0.0
As Table 7 shows, the 24 attacks involved 29 devices. Significantly, 23 were placed on the 
tracks or near a train or other target. only three were placed in the passenger compartment.
Table 7. HSr bomb attacks, by device delivery Method
Method of delivery # devices
% of 
Total
avg 
Fpd
Median 
Fpd
avg 
Ipd
Median 
Ipd
avg 
Fpde
Median 
Fpde
avg 
Ipde
Median 
Ipde
placed on Railroad track or 
Bridge, or Near a train
22 75.9% 1.2 0.0 7.1 0.0 3.9 0.0 22.1 0.0
Concealed/placed in pax 
Compartment, Unspecified 
or other
3 10.3% 1.7 0.0 12.3 0.0 1.7 0.0 12.3 10.0
Unknown 3 10.3% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0
placed Near train, Bus or 
Other Target, Unspecified
1 3.4% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0
ToTalS and averageS 29 100.0% 1.1 0.0 6.6 0.0 2.7 0.0 16.0 0.0
the outcomes of the bombing attempts are shown in table 8. twelve of the 29 devices 
detonated on target. At least five malfunctioned in some way; 11 others were discovered 
and rendered safe.
Table 8. HSr bomb attacks, by outcome
outcome # devices % of Total Fatalities Injuries avg Fpd
Median 
Fpd
avg 
Ipd
Median 
Ipd
Detonated or Released 
on target
12 41.4% 32 192 2.7 0.0 16.0 0.0
eoD Successful, 
Rendered Safe
11 37.9% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Detonated early or Away from 
target, or Malfunctioned
3 10.3% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Failed to Detonate or Release 2 6.9% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown 1 3.4% 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ToTalS and averageS 29 100.0% 32 192 0.2 0.0 1.3 0.0
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III. HIgH-Speed raIl accIdenTS and THeIr SecurITy 
IMplIcaTIonS
one of the long-standing theories of transportation safety is that the speed at which a 
vehicle is traveling is directly associated with the severity of injuries and property damage 
resulting from an accident. the evolution of HSR directly challenges this assumption. 
HSR systems throughout europe and Asia have been working over the past 50 years to 
continually improve safety and increase speed. 
We reviewed HSR safety incidents, primarily in Western europe and east Asia, to identify 
vulnerabilities and gather insights into the possible consequences of terrorist attacks against 
HSR systems. our information sources include investigations conducted by government 
agencies, such as the National transportation Safety Board (NtSB) in the United States; 
operating railroads in european and Asian countries; trade and public media reports; 
railroad press releases; technical reports; and Internet-based forums. Unfortunately, the 
majority of countries operating HSR systems do not make official accident reports publicly 
available. This presented some obstacles to collecting or verifying specific data on train 
speeds, passengers on board, and numbers of injuries or fatalities.
However, our primary challenge was in delineating which incidents involved HSR services 
and equipment and which did not. More often than not, reports regarding derailments, 
collisions, or other incidents on “high-speed trains” concerned commuter or intercity trains 
moving well under 100 mph and designed with top speeds of less than 120 mph. the 
moniker “high-speed” is sometimes used regardless of whether the service meets any 
of the industry’s HSR definitions. In many cases, the label is applied to describe a new 
service that is merely significantly faster than prior service on a particular corridor. 
According to the International Union for Railways (UIC), which defines HSR as lines 
or sections with operating velocities greater than 155 mph, HSR systems are currently 
operating in 13 countries in europe and Asia, and one is operating in the United States. 
Another six countries have new systems in the construction phase or on the drawing board 
(see table 9). 
Table 9. Miles of High-Speed lines in the World
country In operation under construction planned
europe
France 1,265 470 1,496
Germany 829 266 347
Italy 574 0 245
the Netherlands 75 0 0
poland 0 0 442
portugal 0 0 625
Russia 0 0 404
Spain 1,332 1,043 1,058
Sweden 0 0 466
Switzerland 22 45 0
United Kingdom 70 0 127
Asia
China 3,979 2,632 1,803
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country In operation under construction planned
taiwan 214 0 0
India 0 0 1,496
Japan 1,655 263 347
Saudi Arabia 0 342 245
South Korea 256 116 0
turkey 278 471 442
United States
Northeast Corridor 149 0
LA–Sacramento 0 0 559
Note: As of July 1, 2012, lines or sections in which operating velocity was greater than 150 mph.
Source: UIC High Speed Department.
europe
Belgium: Thalys
Figure 1. Thalys route Map
thalys is a joint service offered by the Belgian, French, and Dutch railways. the system 
is centered in Brussels, with three primary lines radiating outward (Figure 1). two of the 
lines, one to paris and one to Amsterdam, are also shared by the eurostar service, and 
the third extends into Cologne, Germany. A fourth line extends northwest from Brussels to 
the city of ostend, on the North Sea. A separate line leaves the paris-Brussels line near 
the France-Belgium border, traveling through the cities of Mons, Charleroi, and Namur 
before joining the Brussels-Cologne line in Liege, essentially providing a southern bypass 
around Brussels. Service extensions now also include routes to Dusseldorf and essen 
from Cologne and a line to Avignon and Marseille, south of paris. trains between paris and 
Brussels, Brussels and Aachen, and Antwerp and Amsterdam use a variety of dedicated 
HSR lines. the remaining service runs primarily on conventional tracks.
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thalys uses two types of trainsets: pBA and pBKA. the pBA sets can operate under 
standard French voltages, also used in the Netherlands, as well as the 3-kv DC supplies used 
in Belgium and Italy. they include a power car on each end, with prime movers, engineer’s 
cabs, and no passenger seating; and eight cars with a capacity of 377 passengers. they 
have a maximum operating speed 185 mph and are pressure-sealed to reduce passenger 
discomfort when entering and exiting tunnels. the pBKA sets are similar to the pBA sets in 
length, number of cars and seats, and operating speeds but use different power cars. Both 
the pBA and pBKA sets are single-level and use articulated coaches that share bogies or 
wheelsets between each coach and independent bogies on the power cars, allowing them 
to separate from the rest of the train without jacks or lifts. 
Finland: VR Pendolino
The state-owned VR (Figure 2) is responsible for managing the passenger and freight 
rail services in Finland. In 2010, the railway network infrastructure maintenance and 
construction functions were divested into the Finnish transport Agency. Although the term 
pendolino is a brand name of Fiat (later, Alstom) for a line or “family” of tilting trains, it is 
also the service brand used by the VG Group for their high-speed services. The service 
uses Pendolino (VR Class Sm3) trainsets built by Rautaruukki-Transtech between 2000 
and 2006. The trains are capable of 140 mph service, although existing lines have limited 
their typical operation to less than 120 mph.
Figure 2. vr pendolino route Map
In 2006, the first segment of 140 mph track was opened between Kerava and Lahti. Its 
18 trainsets are all configured in the same fashion: 18 cars, including two end coaches 
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with engineer’s cabs that are in either the leading or trailing position and a total passenger 
capacity of 309. Domestic service is currently offered on five separate routes radiating 
from Helsinki, with two to 10 trains per day, depending on the route.
A new HSR service was introduced in 2010 as a joint venture between the VR Group 
and the Russian Railways (RZhD) under the name Karelian trains Ltd. the new service, 
using Alstom pendolino Sm6 trains, is branded Allegro and has reduced train travel time 
between Helsinki, Finland, and St. petersburg, Russia, from 5.5 hours to 3 hours. the 
seven-car trainsets have a capacity of 377 passengers.
France: TGV 
France’s TGV (train à grande vitesse) started its HSR service between Paris and Lyon in 
1981. The TGV HSR network operated by Société Nationale des Chemins de fer Français 
(SNCF) now consists of eight lines, all radiating from paris, and extends into Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy (Figure 3). In addition to operating 
the country’s 20,000-mile rail network, SNCF has become a multinational powerhouse in 
railroad consulting, construction, and operation. In 1997, an eU directive forced SNCF 
to divest ownership of the rail infrastructure to a separate, government-owned entity, 
Réseau Ferré de France. SNCF and its partner Alstom have successfully exported the 
TGV technology to HSR operations in Spain, Taiwan, South Korea, and Belgium. 
Figure 3. Tgv route Map
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TGV runs high-speed trains on two types of lines: LGV and Lines Classiques. LGV lines 
were designed and built specifically for dedicated use by high-speed trainsets. They have 
no level road crossings, and they have ROW fences and barriers that significantly reduce 
or prevent trespassing by vehicles, humans, and animals, all of which can significantly 
damage and/or derail trainsets and lead to injuries and fatalities. 
Lines Classiques are mixed-use systems that run freight, intercity, and HSR service. 
Further differences between LGV and Lines Classiques include:
• Track curvature: LGV lines are constructed with larger-radii curves and longer 
approaches into the curves, allowing for higher-speed operations without increased 
centripetal force.
• track cant: the cant or super-elevation of a track is the horizontal angle or slope 
of a track through a curve. the cant is kept to a minimum on Lines Classiques, 
whereas on LGV lines, the cant is maximized to allow for better track adhesion and 
train equilibrium. 
• Track gauge: The gauge tolerances on LGV lines are significantly lower, and design 
standards are much more precise.
• Track components: LGV lines, like most other dedicated HSR lines throughout the 
world, are built with more cross-ties, or sleepers, per mile than traditional lines. 
these ties are made of reinforced concrete, either solid or monobloc or bibloc (two 
smaller concrete ties that sit directly under the rail), connected by a steel reinforcing 
bar. the rail is fastened, not spiked, to the ties with a variety of clips and often has 
a rubber or other material pad separating it from the tie to absorb and dampen 
vibration and noise while reducing friction wear. 
• Track bed: The underlayment of LGV track structure is typically ballast, like that of 
most other railroads, but the bed of ballast is much deeper.
• Switches: LGV lines in France and many other HSR systems use swingnose or 
movable frog switches that allow for safe crossovers up to 100 mph.
• Catenary: All HSR overhead electrification must be built to maintain greater 
mechanical tension than other catenary applications on commuter rail or rail transit 
systems. 
• Signaling: On LGV lines and other systems throughout the world that achieve and 
exceed 200 mph continuous operations, traditional wayside signals are not usable. 
TGV currently uses eight types of trainsets running at maximum speeds of 170 mph to 
200 mph, depending on the trainset design and operating line. While the trainsets range 
in length and seating capacity (from roughly 350 to 750 passengers), all share a common 
design trait: In addition to a power car at each end of the train, all of the intermediate cars 
“share” a truck or bogie at each end. Although this design makes separating trainsets for 
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service or other reasons extremely difficult, it has been credited with keeping the trainsets 
vertical and linear in several incidents, including the December 1992 derailment of a train 
travelling 182 mph when the track gave way because of a large sinkhole. 
There have been 17 TGV HSR accidents (both LGV and Lines Classiques) since service 
began. Of these, 11 (65%) involved collisions at grade crossings. After its first HSR grade-
crossing collision, in September 1988, TGV improved the crash-protection safety features 
of its trainsets, significantly reducing injuries and deaths caused by collisions. 
Germany: ICE
the West German National Railway, Deutsche Bundesbahn, began testing an experimental 
high-speed train developed by a Siemens Corporation–led consortium in 1984. The first 
InterCityexpress (ICe) service was launched in 1991 between Hamburg and Munich. 
Service to Bremen and Nuremburg began a year later (Figure 4). In 1994, a few years 
after the reunification of Germany, the assets and operations of Deutsche Bundesbahn 
and Deutsche Reichsbahn, the former east German national railway, were merged into 
Deutsche Bahn AG (DBAG). DBAG is a private, publicly traded multinational corporation 
divided into four separate operating entities: DB Bahn, which provides passenger rail 
service in Germany; DB Netze, which is responsible for the nation’s rail infrastructure and 
operations; DB Schenker, a freight rail and logistics operation; and Arriva, which provides 
contract passenger rail services in the UK.
Figure 4. Ice route Map
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DB Bahn is further broken into three business units: DB Stadtverkehr, which operates 
multiple bus companies and provides commuter rail service in Hamburg and Berlin; DB 
Fernverkehr, the provider of all high-speed and non-HSR intercity passenger service, 
including ICe, in Germany; and DB Regio, which provides non-HSR short- and medium-
distance service. 
ICE rolling stock includes 259 trainsets in five variants: ICE 1, ICE 2, ICE 3, ICE T, and 
ICe tD (diesel powered), all manufactured by Siemens or Siemens-led partnerships. the 
most current iteration, ICE 3, is an eight-passenger-car, two-power-car configuration, with 
a capacity of approximately 450 passengers and sustained speeds of 200 mph. Except in 
the 186 mph, 107-mile corridor from Nuremburg to Ingolstadt, halfway to Munich, most ICe 
trains are limited to 170 mph or slower operations. Unlike SNCF and JR Group, DBAG has 
implemented almost all ICe services on existing rail lines that continue to serve freight rail 
and slower-speed intercity and commuter rail operations. this shared-corridor relationship 
has been the catalyst for DBAG and its vendors to aggressively develop and refine the 
technology for tilting trains, allowing for higher-speed operations on curves, with negligible 
super-elevation. 
ICe is the most multinational HSR operation in the world, providing service throughout 
Germany and across the borders of France, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, 
and the Netherlands. Similar to TGV, ICE technology—primarily trainset designs and 
configurations—has been exported to Spanish HSR operator RENFE, to China for the 
Beijing-to-tianjin HSR service, and to Russia for the St. petersburg-to-Moscow Sapsan 
service that is replacing the Nevsky express.
Italy: Trenitalia
Figure 5. Trenitalia route Map
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Like those of other eU countries, Italy’s railroad network and operations were reorganized 
at the turn of this century as a result of eU deregulation and directives. the Rete Ferroviaria 
Italiana (RFI), a subsidiary of Ferrovie dello Stato (FS), owns and operates the Italian 
railway network infrastructure, providing signaling, train control, and maintenance. FS is 
an Italian-owned government company responsible for all of the country’s rail operations 
and infrastructure. Another subsidiary of FS is trenitalia, the primary operator of all freight 
and passenger train service, including HSR, in the country (Figure 5). In 2012 trenitalia 
began to face new competition from Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori (NTV). 
trenitalia began offering HSR service between Rome and Milan in 1989. It currently offers 
HSR service on two primary corridors: Turin to Venice via Milan, and Milan to Salerno 
via Bologna, Florence, Rome, and Naples. Depending on the trainset series and length/
configuration, Trenitalia HSR trains can run at maximum speeds of between 155 mph and 
210 mph and can carry between 390 and 570 passengers.
Spain: RENFE
Spain has the second largest network of HSR lines in the world (Figure 6). In 1941, its railways 
were nationalized, forming Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles españoles (ReNFe). Since 
2005, when an eU directive mandated the separation of track ownership from operations, 
the country’s rail infrastructure has been under Administrador de Infrestructuras Ferroviarias 
(ADIF), which is responsible for the management, maintenance, and construction functions 
associated with ReNFe, including high-speed-passenger and conventional, mixed-use 
lines.
ReNFe handles Spain’s rail activities in four divisions: commuter and medium-distance 
high-speed and conventional passenger trains; long-distance high-speed and conventional 
passenger trains; freight service; and rolling stock acquisition and maintenance. Long-
distance HSR service is offered under the brand name Alta Velocidad Española (AVE), 
which runs service on four primary dedicated HSR lines radiating from AVE’s operational 
hub in Madrid. HSR trains reaching 185 mph operate out to Barcelona, Valladolid, Seville, 
and Valencia. Medium-range, dedicated HSR network service is provided under the name 
AVANT on portions of the longer lines or on short extensions or branches. Connecting or 
extending past the primary and secondary cities on the HSR network is the ALIVIA service. 
This operation uses high-speed trainsets, capable of 140 mph to 160 mph, running long-
distance service on dedicated HSR lines and conventional, mixed-use lines. A fourth 
and much smaller brand of service is euromed, which runs south from Barcelona, along 
the Mediterranean coast, to Valencia and Alicante. The Euromed operation utilizes six 
trainsets, derived from TGV Atlantique and Reseau designs, and travels predominantly on 
conventional lines.
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Figure 6. renFe route Map
As in most countries, the differences between newly constructed, often-dedicated HSR lines 
and conventional, possibly mixed-traffic routes are in the design and construction of the 
overhead catenary, grade separations, and the elevation and construction of track tangents 
and curves. RENFE currently utilizes 12 different trainset designs and configurations from 
up to six separate manufacturers or consortiums. Operating speeds in the fleet range from 
140 mph to 217 mph, and capacities range from 300 to 400 passengers. The configurations 
differ in length, from four cars to 13 cars (11 coaches plus two power cars), with some sets 
utilizing power cars, while others are electrical multiple units (eMUs) with engineer’s cabs 
in end cars.
Sweden: SJ-2000
Bergslagernas Järnvägar and other, smaller private railroads in Sweden, some dating back 
to the 19th century, were nationalized in 1948, forming the Royal Railway Board, which in 
turn became the Swedish State Railways, also known as Statens Järnvägar (SJ) (Figure 
7). the country’s railroad infrastructure was transferred to the Swedish Rail Administration 
in 1998, and the remaining operations and assets were divided up into seven separate 
government-held companies. A “new” SJ corporation was formed in 2000 from the public 
transport division of its predecessor and is now the primary passenger-train operator in 
Sweden. the Swedish Rail Administration was merged into a larger government agency 
in 2009, along with the road and maritime administrations, to form the Swedish transport 
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Administration, which now owns and maintains all state-owned roads and railroads and is 
responsible for planning in all modes of transportation.
Figure 7. SJ-2000 route Map
operating at the low end of the HSR spectrum, with a top speed of 130 mph, the SJ-2000 
high-speed train (previously and more commonly known as the X-2000) was launched 
in 1990. From the beginning, the X-2000 was a unique operation in several ways. It was 
the first HSR train—as opposed to older steam- and diesel-powered intercity trains—to 
offer only first-class service. Second-class service was introduced in 1995. The external 
design of the X-2000 harked back to the early days of streamlined passenger rail service, 
incorporating fluted or ribbed stainless-steel sides on the power cars and the coaches. 
Unlike Japan and France, Sweden chose not to build any new HSR infrastructure and runs 
X-2000 on an existing rail system, continually shared with lower-speed passenger and 
freight trains. owing to this decision, SJ has invested considerable time and resources into 
train-tilting technology and steerable trucks, or bogies. 
The configuration of the X-2000 trainsets is also unique among HSR rolling stock. HSR 
trainsets typically have a power car at each end, with unpowered coaches in between, or 
are eMU designs, with either power-collection pantographs and/or powered axles with 
traction motors on all or several cars in a set. the typical X-2000 consists of a single power 
car, four unpowered coaches, and an unpowered coach with an engineer’s cab at the 
rear. this design allows SJ to add cars, up to a maximum of 16, to a trainset, providing a 
maximum capacity of 1,600 passengers. While in form and function the X-2000 is an HSR 
trainset, operationally it is an electric-locomotive-hauled passenger train. the X-2000’s 
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steerable, or “soft,” bogies adjust automatically on curves, with axles that pivot laterally 
with the frame, allowing the train to reach speeds 40% greater than conventional rolling 
stock without increasing stresses on the track or the wheel/rail interface. tilting technology 
also permits the train to operate at higher speeds on less-super-elevated curves while 
maintaining passenger comfort, by shifting the train’s center of gravity and reducing the 
lateral forces pulling it to the outside of a curve.
Like other HSR equipment, the X-2000 uses an automatic train control system that provides 
information to the engineer up to 2.5 miles in advance of his location. If the information is 
not acknowledged or appropriately replied to, the train brakes are applied automatically. 
the train also uses three independent braking systems: an electric regenerative brake for 
speed adjustments; air-operated disc brakes for normal, or “hard,” braking; and a magnetic 
track brake for use in emergencies. Using the air-operated brakes, the train will take 1.1 
miles to stop when moving at 125 mph. Applying the magnetic track brake when moving at 
the same speed will stop the train in 0.75 mile.
United Kingdom: Eurostar 
there are two primary routes in the eurostar system: London to Brussels and London 
to paris. Seasonal service is offered south of paris to Avignon and Bourg-Saint-Maurice 
(Figure 8). every eurostar train operates out of St. pancras Station in London, through the 
Channel tunnel, to Lille in northern France. At Lille, trains head either south to paris or 
other seasonal destinations or northeast to Brussels.
Figure 8. eurostar route Map
eurostar’s most iconic feature and prime safety and security challenge is the Channel 
Tunnel. Opened in 1994, the tunnel provided the first-ever surface-transportation 
connection between the UK and the rest of europe. eurotunnel S.A., a publicly traded 
company that was formed to design, build, and operate the tunnel, brings in revenue by 
charging Eurostar and other, non-HSR operators fees for using the tunnel. Stretching 31.4 
miles from Folkstone in the UK to Coquelles in France, the tunnel includes two 24-foot-
diameter running tunnels and a 16-foot-diameter service tunnel. the service tunnel, located 
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between the two running tunnels, is kept at a higher pressure to prevent smoke or fumes 
from entering (similar to stairwells in high-rise buildings) and is connected to the two other 
tunnels by passageways located every 1,230 feet from portal to portal. the tunnel also 
includes two large caverns, one 7.5 miles from the French shore line and the other 4 miles 
south of Shakespeare Cliff in the UK. these two caverns house crossovers between the 
north and south running tunnels, allowing trains to bypass sections that are closed due to 
emergencies or routine maintenance.
Eurostar uses only one type of trainset, built by Alstom, which also built the TGV fleet of 
trainsets. It has 20 cars and 750 seats and comprises two power cars with no passenger 
seating and 18 coaches. the trains can operate at 185 mph. the major difference 
between the Eurostar and TGV trainsets is a smaller cross-section due to tighter right-of-
way clearances in the UK. For safety reasons, the eurostar trains comprise two half-sets. 
the contiguous ends of coaches 9 and 10 do not share a wheel set or bogie, unlike the 
articulated connections between the other 16 coaches. the connection between coaches 
9 and 10 uses a Scharfenberg coupler, which allows relatively quick disconnection in the 
event of an emergency. While articulation has proven to reduce the possibility of jackknifing 
cars during a derailment or collision, it also eliminates the possibility of operating anything 
less than a full trainset once it leaves a service yard. the coupler at the center of the train 
gives eurostar crews the ability to move passengers to another section of the train in the 
event of a fire, derailment, collision, or security threat; split the train in half; and move the 
nonaffected set with the passengers away from the source of danger. 
Eurostar trains also operate with two qualified engineers. On each run, the engineer 
occupies the cab of the lead power car and the Chef du train, or conductor, occupies the 
rear-power car cab. If the engineer is injured or killed in an incident, the conductor can 
uncouple the two halves of the train and operate the back half in reverse, away from the 
incident scene. this arrangement also helps address hours-of-service issues, since the 
two individuals switch roles once a train reaches a terminal and reverses direction. 
power is sent to the train’s traction motors, located on the four axles of each power car, as 
well as the unshared bogies on the first and last coaches of the train. Depending on the 
route, Eurostar trains use four or five signal systems on a single run. These range from 
warning systems based on 60-year-old technology to the TVM system used on TGV’s LGV 
lines. 
In the past 16 years, there have been four instances in which eurostar trains have 
stalled in the tunnel, stranding large numbers of passengers for an extended period of 
time. While no injuries were sustained in these events, long delays could lead to hostile 
situations between passengers or passengers and crew, as well as dangerous situations 
for individuals with medical and/or medication needs.
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asia
China: Chinese High-Speed Railway
Although the Chinese Ministry of Railways (MOR) did not begin construction of its first 
HSR line until 1998, China is now home to the world’s largest HSR network. The first 
line, from Beijing to tianjin, opened a week before the 2008 olympics; a little more than 
four years later, the country had 5,809 miles of high-speed lines with trains traveling 186 
mph (Figure 9). the network includes eight primary routes: four north/south lines and 
four running east and west, concentrating service in the population centers in the eastern 
portion of the country.
Figure 9. chinese High-Speed railway route Map
A key part of China’s HSR plans focuses on developing the domestic intellectual and 
manufacturing capacity to design and construct HSR trains and infrastructure components. 
The first bids solicited by the MOR called for a “technology transfer,” enabling China’s 
railroad-sector manufacturers to evolve toward majority, if not complete, domestic 
production of all HSR-related equipment. Alstom, Bombardier, and Kawasaki were 
awarded parts of an order for 200 trainsets that required them to establish a joint venture 
with a Chinese company to allow for this technology transfer. A year later, the Siemens 
Corporation negotiated a deal with MoR and entered into a joint venture to deliver 60 
trainsets based on the ICe 3 trains. these partnerships succeeded in meeting China’s 
initial demand for HSR trainsets and jump-starting domestic production. However, claims 
of patent theft by Kawasaki raised industry concerns over the long-term benefits of such 
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arrangements. the Chinese manufacturers involved in the joint ventures are now working 
to export their technology to fledgling HSR operations in Europe, South America, North 
America, and Asia. 
the MoR has developed a domestic signal/train control system based on learning from 
the european train control system and other foreign practices combined with Chinese 
technological advancements. the Chinese train control system (CtCS) is segregated into 
five levels. The first two, CTCS-0 and CTCS-1, use track circuits to identify occupied track 
and set wayside and cab signals appropriately. CtCS-2 is used in 125 to 155 mph territory 
and incorporates more-advanced track circuit detection and communication technology with 
automatic-train-protection (Atp) features that initiate proper braking procedures similar to 
automatic train control systems in europe and North America. CtCS-3 incorporates wireless 
wayside-to-train communications similar to TGV’s system on its LGV lines. CTCS-3 is 
used on routes where speeds can reach 186 to 217 mph. Like the TGV LGV, operations at 
this speed cannot rely on wayside signals because of reaction time and must incorporate 
wireless signaling, communication, and train control features, including fail-safe features that 
can compensate for human error, slow reaction times, and longer stopping distances. the 
highest level, CTCS-4, is in the research and development phase for implementation in 200 
mph and higher-speed operations.
the Chinese HSR network has implemented unique RoW and track construction methods 
throughout the system. Much of the RoW, particularly through the more densely populated 
suburban and urban areas, is built on concrete viaducts. More than 85% of the two-track 
line between Beijing and tianjin on the Beijing-Shanghai route is elevated on viaducts. 
While this is a more expensive design, it is also a much faster approach to building a rapidly 
growing network of HSR trains. All of the new dedicated HSR lines are built using slab or 
ballastless track. Slab track, which is also being increasingly used in Japan, incorporates 
fixed concrete panels that have pads on which the rail rests directly and receivers for 
rail clips. this eliminates the need for ties or sleepers. Much like prefabricated concrete 
bridges, the slabs are fastened together to form a continuous RoW on which the rails are 
laid. the slabs are the full width of the track and incorporate channels and ports for proper 
drainage. 
Unlike traditional track, which uses ties with equal or larger spaces in between them, 
placed on ballast, ballastless track uses ties placed adjacent to each other, with no spacing, 
on a slab. The initial construction cost of both slab and ballastless track is significantly 
higher than that of traditional ballast track designs using concrete, wood, or resin ties, but 
the maintenance costs over the life of the track are much lower. Advocates of slab and/
or ballastless track also claim that it provides a smoother ride and greater safety, since 
defects are less likely to occur and easier to identify.
Japan: Shinkansen
In the wake of World War II, Japanese National Railways (JNR) was organized to redevelop 
and operate a national rail network. one of JNR’s early goals was to design and construct 
high-speed, or “bullet,” passenger trains linking the country’s major cities. In 1964, Shinkansen 
became the world’s first HSR system, stretching 340 miles between Tokyo and Shin-Osaka 
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and running trains at maximum speeds of 130 mph. Shinkansen quickly became an icon 
of national pride and continued to thrive despite the dissolution of JNR due to financial 
troubles and the division of its assets and operations among seven separate private-sector 
companies collectively known as the Japan Railways Group (JR Group). 
today, the Shinkansen network includes more than 1,600 route miles (Figure 10) and 
operates approximately 900 trains per day at speeds between 150 and 190 mph. It is 
owned and operated by five private companies of the JR Group: JR Kyushu, JR West, 
JR Central, JR Hokkaido, and the largest, by far, in terms of system size and passenger 
volume, JR East. These companies utilize 20 different styles and configurations of overhead 
electrically powered trainsets with power cars at each end. Capacities per trainset range 
from approximately 380 passengers on six- and seven-car sets to 1,200 passengers on 
12-car bilevel trainsets and more than 1,300 on 16-car sets.
Figure 10. Shinkansen route Map
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throughout its history, Shinkansen has maintained an exemplary safety record, with only 
four in-service fatalities, three of which involved persons intentionally jumping from the train 
to commit suicide. the fourth fatality, in December 1995, was the result of a passenger 
being caught in the train door. 
South Korea: Korean Train eXpress (KTX)
Korail, South Korea’s national rail carrier for all levels of freight and passenger service, 
introduced Korean Train eXpress (KTX) HSR service in April 2004. The Gyeongbu line runs 
from Seoul to Busan, and the Honam line runs from a junction with Gyeongbu in osong 
to Mokpo. Even though HSR trainsets began operating on both lines on the first day of 
service, the Gyeongbu line was not completed as a dedicated HSR line until November 
2010 (Figure 11). Dedicated HSR expansions to the Honam line are scheduled to be 
completed in 2014 and 2017. Until then, KTX service will operate with HSR equipment on 
a combination of completed HSR lines and conventional lines.
Figure 11. Korean Train express route Map
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KTX uses the KTX-I trainset, derived from the TGV Reseau. It consists of two power cars 
and 18 articulated cars, with a capacity of 935 passengers and a top speed of 190 mph. 
the KtX-I was initially built in France by Alstom but is now produced by Rotem in South 
Korea. A shorter version called the KtX-II was developed for routes with fewer riders. 
Consisting of only eight articulated cars and two power cars, the KtX-II has a capacity of 
363 passengers and a top speed of 190 mph. A year after its introduction in 2010, Korail 
asked the manufacturer, Hyundai-Rotem, to take all 19 sets back following a series of 15 
malfunctions and train shutdowns, along with the discovery of structural cracks.
United States: Northeast Corridor – Amtrak Acela
Figure 12. amtrak acela route Map
Grade separations, overhead electrification, some super-elevated curves, advanced 
signaling systems, and the elimination of all but 11 grade crossings have brought Amtrak’s 
Northeast Corridor (NeC) up to respectable HSR corridor standards (Figure 12). Although 
Acela trains, Amtrak’s HSR brand, can reach speeds of 150 mph, track and catenary 
designs limit much of the operation to 90 to 110 mph. From New Haven south through 
New York to Washington, DC, the system still has the rigid suspension architecture first 
developed by its predecessor railroads. If this catenary system is upgraded, the Acela will 
be able to realize increased speeds on parts of the line, but the curvature of some track 
and the omnipresent commuter trains sharing the route will always be an obstacle to 
achieving the speeds the trainsets are capable of.
Because of unique and stringent crashworthiness standards in the United States, proven 
off-the-shelf trainsets such as the ICE, TGV, or Shinkansen could not be considered for 
Acela service. Amtrak selected a consortium bid from Bombardier and Alstom in 1996 with 
a provision that the sets be manufactured in the United States. Using existing facilities, 
Bombardier built the power cars in plattsburg, New York, and the coaches were built in 
Montpelier, Vermont. 
The trainset configuration is similar to earlier TGV designs such as the Atlantique and 
Thalys. It has two power cars, one at each end, and six cars—a first-class coach, a café 
car, and four business-class coaches. Like the TGV sets, it is semi-permanently coupled 
and does not use articulated cars sharing bogies/trucks. It also borrowed the traction 
system, regenerative braking, bogie/truck structure, disc brakes (three rather than four 
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per axle), and crash-absorption technology from later-generation TGVs. After the adoption 
of tier II crash standards by the U.S. Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) in 1999, the 
car design had to be modified so that the vestibules could effectively act as crash-energy-
management or crumble zones in a derailment or collision. this meant that low-level steps 
and trap doors had to be eliminated from the plans, not only limiting use of the system to 
service on high-level-platform stations but also complicating evacuation procedures out 
on the line. Foldable evacuation ladders were installed at each exit on the trains to help 
alleviate this problem. 
Borrowing only the concept from the X-2000, the Acela trainsets incorporated tilting 
technology from Bombardier’s 1980 design for the Light-Rapid-Comfortable (LRC) trains 
used by VIA Rail in Canada. This allowed for faster speeds on curves that were not super-
elevated by shifting and lowering the center of gravity and reducing passenger discomfort 
with lateral G-forces. 
The trainsets also included other “firsts” on North American passenger trains: The power 
cars were equipped with emergency evacuation hatches in the engineer-cab roofs, and 
standpipe connections were installed on both sides to allow firefighters to flood the engine 
compartment without having to perform interior firefighting operations in the unit. Each car 
of the train was also designed with a “cut spot” in the roof. this area is free of any electrical 
conduit, structural members, or other obstacles and is clearly marked. It provides a clear 
spot through which rescue personnel could cut their way if a car is rolled over or has 
material blocking window or door access. 
In its 12 years of operation, Amtrak Acela service has had a number of tragic pedestrian 
accidents. Seventeen trespassers have either committed suicide or been killed accidently 
when walking along or across NeC tracks. two Amtrak or contractor employees have also 
been killed and two seriously injured while working on the RoW. Since 2010, following a 
much-needed infusion of capital funds, Amtrak has been aggressively working on installing 
fencing and other barriers on the entire NeC route in the hopes of restricting or deterring 
trespassing. It has also eliminated trees, brush and extraneous infrastructure immediately 
adjacent to the rail line, giving engineers a broader view and better reaction time.
HSr Safety Incidents
Of the 12 systems profiled here, ten have experienced one or more serious incidents 
resulting in fatalities. Half of the incidents involved only one fatality, four of which were 
suicides. table 10 provides a breakdown of HSR incidents involving fatalities, by type of 
incident.
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Table 10. HSr Incidents Involving Fatalities
Type of Incident # of Incidents HSr passenger/crew Fatalities other Fatalities Total Fatalities
Grade Crossing Collision 5 2 7 9
equipment Issue 3 110 0 110
Collision with HSR train 1 40 0 40
Collision with other than a HSR train 4 2 2 4
Suicide 4 4 0 4
Total 17 158 9 167
Most incidents involving HSR service and equipment, aside from grade-crossing collisions 
on shared corridors, have been attributed to engineering failures in the design and/or 
construction of the rolling stock or RoW. Most HSR systems have been designed to include 
one or more fail-safe features to compensate for operational human error. table 11 provides 
a breakdown of incidents by system, primarily incidents involving injuries or fatalities to on-
board crew and/or passengers and/or significant damage to rolling stock or the infrastructure. 
pedestrian incidents involving employees, passengers, or trespassers are, for the most 
part, not included. While almost always fatal and tragic, not only for the victim but also for 
the engineer and crew, the victim’s family and friends, and emergency responders, these 
incidents rarely cause much damage to the rolling stock or track or cause physical injuries 
to passengers or crew on board. pedestrian incidents included in the report are those that 
involved HSR operations or equipment, regardless of whether it was moving, in a station, or 
in a storage or service.
Table 11. HSr Incidents, by System
HSr System years of operation
# of 
Incidents
# of 
Injuries
# of 
Fatalities
average 
Injuries/ 
Incident
average 
Fatalities/ 
Incident
Shinkansen 49 10 0 4 0.0 0.4
ICe 22 17 164 102 9.6 6.0
TGV 32 17 134 4 7.9 0.2
eurostar 19 6 14 1 2.3 0.2
thalys 17 2 6 1 3.0 0.5
ReNFe 22 1 142 2 142.0 2.0
trenitalia 25 4 56 9 14.0 2.3
SJ-2000 24 9 19 1 2.1 0.1
VR Pendolino 7 2 0 0 0.0 0.0
Korean train eXpress 9 1 1 0 1.0 0.0
Acela 13 3 0 3 0.0 1.0
Chinese High-Speed Railway 15 1 210 40 210.0 40.0
Total 254 73 746 167 10.2 2.3
Appendix A presents a detailed listing of each incident, including the date; line; equipment; 
train speed; a description; follow-up actions, if any; injuries; and fatalities. It is important 
to note that more than half of the incidents (38 of the 73), including the world’s fastest 
derailment, did not result in any injuries or deaths. 
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The world’s fastest derailment occurred in December 1992, when a 10-car TGV train 
traveling at 182 mph on the Paris-Lille LGV Nord line crossed what appeared to be a 10-
foot by 20-foot mud puddle. the mud puddle turned out to unsupported track, traversing 
what was actually a 23-foot-long, 5-foot-deep sinkhole. the engineer felt a small bump 
and applied the brake. the last four coaches and the trailing power car derailed. Despite 
the back half of the train derailing, the trainset remained upright and in line with the track. 
Accident investigators attributed this to the design of the shared bogies in the trainset and 
the trainset’s relative stiffness. of the 200 passengers on board, one was slightly injured 
and one was treated for shock. 
the average injuries per incident and average fatalities per incident are actually driven by 
nine events that resulted in more than 20 injuries and between 0 and 101 deaths. those 
nine events are described below.
THe nIne MoST SerIouS HSr IncIdenTS
1. ICE – June 1998
on June 3, 1998, an ICe 1 train traveling at 125 mph derailed near the town of eschede, 
in northern Germany. Like many incidents, particularly those with tragic outcomes, the 
“eschede disaster” was preceded by a series events that, if altered, could have either 
prevented the accident and/or significantly reduced the magnitude of the tragedy. 
In the late 1990s, DBAG discovered that the single-cast, solid-steel wheels on the ICe 1 trainsets 
were wearing unevenly, becoming “unround” over time. this process caused vibrations that 
were being transmitted into the car bodies of the train. the ICe 2 and later-generation sets 
included pneumatic suspensions, which prevented the vibration problems inherent in the steel-
spring bogie suspensions of the ICE 1 trainsets. All ICE 1 trainsets were retrofitted with new 
Bochum 84 wheels that had cast steel centers mounted onto an axle with bearings. A 
rubber ring upon which another cast steel tire was mounted was placed around the cast 
steel center. the rubber between the two cast-steel components of the wheel was intended 
to be a vibration absorber, yielding a smoother ride. While the wheels initially served their 
purpose at all speeds of operation, the design induced significant and unexpected fatigue, 
ultimately causing cracks in the outer steel tire. These cracks were very difficult to detect 
because they occurred on the inner part of the wheel, where the steel tire met the rubber 
insert. 
About 3.5 miles before the ICE 1 accident site, a steel tire on the third axle of the first 
passenger car behind the lead power car cracked apart, and a substantial piece punctured 
the floor of the car. A passenger quickly alerted the conductor, who was in the third coach, 
but the conductor did not have the power under DB rules to stop the train until he visually 
inspected the problem. In the one minute it took for the passenger to make notification and 
the conductor to return to the affected car, the train traveled a little over 2 miles. At that 
moment, it went through a crossover switch near a highway overpass, and the remains of 
the wheel were caught in the flange guide rail of the switch. The impact derailed the axle 
of the cracked wheel and ripped the guide rail from the crossties, pushing it into a vertical 
position, where it punctured the floor of the car and lifted the bogie off the rails. This was 
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the first time the engineer had any indication of a problem. He reported he felt a “pull” on 
the back of the train and looked back to see the derailment unfolding. 
As the train went through the second crossover switch, the derailed bogies caused the 
switch points to realign. this sent the trailing bogie of car three onto a parallel track, and 
the body of the car hit the concrete piers of the 300-ton roadway bridge as it passed 
underneath. the 120 mph impact destroyed the bridge supports, completely collapsing 
the structure. As the trainset derailed and separated, emergency brakes on each car were 
automatically activated. 
the lead power car stayed on the rails and came to a stop two miles down the line from 
the accident site. The first three coaches derailed but remained upright and came to a stop 
about 100 feet beyond the bridge. Coach four was moving fast enough to go under and 
clear the bridge before it collapsed. Car four was separated from the first three, derailed, 
and rolled over into trees along the RoW. Adding to the tragedy of the accident, two DB 
employees working along the RoW were crushed and killed by the car as it rolled over.
The fifth coach was actually severed by the collapsed bridge. The front half traveled about 
300 feet past the bridge, while the rear half was crushed under the weight of the overpass. 
Car six was directly under the bridge at the time of the collapse and was completely 
flattened. Cars seven through 11 were all destroyed under or up against the remains of 
the bridge. The twelfth and final car of the train did not impact the bridge but was partially 
crushed by the rear power car, which, itself, received minimal damage. the train had a 
capacity of 743 passengers but was carrying only 287 at the time of the accident. The 
aftermath of the incident is shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13. The eschede Incident Scene
A week after the incident, the final death toll reached 101, including the two DB employees 
who were working along the RoW. eighty-eight passengers and crew were also injured in 
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the incident. The official accident report as well as research reports that analyzed available 
data on the incident concluded that the root cause was a catastrophic failure of a wheel 
tire. the application of the wheel technology was questioned and openly criticized prior to 
the incident, and some officials felt that the testing of the materials prior to the installation 
was inadequate.
the severity of the incident was exacerbated by the environment in which the wheel failure 
occurred and by the procedural reactions of the passengers and crew. Had the wheel 
failed along a section of RoW that did not include crossover switches (turnouts), the train 
would most likely have remained linear and upright. the location of the highway bridge pier 
between the tracks was the most significant contributing cause, since it not only presented 
an obstruction for the derailed cars but led to the failure and collapse of the bridge, which 
directly caused most of the fatalities, injuries, and damage. 
DB company policies prohibited the conductor or any other train crew member from applying 
the train’s emergency brakes until a visual inspection of the situation was performed. this 
delay provided the time for the accident chain to play out and the derailed train to collide 
with the bridge pier. The passenger who first noticed the broken guardrail puncturing the 
floor of the carriage was apparently also not informed through announcements or safety 
cards to apply the brakes in the event of an emergency.
As in any transportation incident of this magnitude, lessons are learned, policies are 
changed, and practices from engineering to operations are evaluated and modified. DB 
assessed a number of its procedures, including the testing and inspection of materials, track 
components, and rolling stock, as well as response directives for crew and passengers. 
Many other HSR operators and non-HSR passenger rail systems around the world also 
analyzed the pre- and post-incident factors of the Eschede incident and modified their 
policies and practices.
In the United States, officials from the Federal Highway Administration and several state 
departments of transportation are investigating ways to design and build new highway 
overpasses that cross rail lines, rivers, and other roads to eliminate mid-span piers located 
in the flow of traffic. This will improve safety and eliminate potential obstructions that could 
cause or escalate accidents. other countries are conducting similar efforts to create safer 
crossings, as well as specifically relocating rail crossovers, where possible, away from 
existing bridge piers or other potential RoW obstructions.
DB and other railroad operators in europe also began to look at how the design and 
construction of rolling stock contributed to the amount and severity of injuries and fatalities 
and hampered egress and access efforts by passengers and emergency responders. 
In the United States, railroads began to improve responder training and develop new 
standards for passenger-car construction, including the design, labeling, and operation of 
emergency-exit windows and doors.
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2. Chinese High-Speed Railway – July 2011
Worries about the haste with which China is building its HSR system peaked in July 2011, 
when one high-speed train carrying 558 people plowed into the back of another train 
carrying 1,072 people on a viaduct near Wenzhou in southeastern China. Forty people 
were killed and more than 200 were injured, 12 of whom remained in critical condition for 
several days following the collision.
A severe thunder and lightning storm had caused signal problems that evening, and train 
engineers were being directed by control-center dispatchers to proceed with caution at 
speeds below 12 mph if they came across red signals. this procedure was intended to 
allow any engineer to safely stop the train if any other trains or obstructions were seen 
on the tracks ahead. the engineer of the lead train proceeded as directed, but the Atp 
feature shut down his train after he passed a red signal. At that point, the compromised 
track-detection circuitry failed to identify the train in the block and established a green 
signal for the train behind it. 
After seven minutes of trying to override the Atp system, the lead-train engineer was able 
to restart his train. Unfortunately, the train behind it had a green signal, so it was never 
directed to switch to visual running procedure and went past the signal at normal operating 
speed. Shortly after exiting a tunnel, the trailing train quickly came upon the lead train, 
which was just starting to move, and slammed into the rear end of it at 62 mph. 
the last car of the lead train (a coach car with an engineer’s cab) and the next three cars 
derailed and were knocked off the viaduct by the collision. three of the cars fell 50 feet to 
the ground below, and one car ended up vertically—one end was on the ground and the 
other was leaning against the top of the viaduct. the lead coach/engineer’s-cab car and 
the first car of the other train also derailed but remained on the viaduct. The first car was 
demolished by the impact, and the second car rode up on top of it. Although unconfirmed, 
it is speculated that most of the deceased were in the lead train cars that fell off the viaduct 
and the first car of the trailing train. Neither trainset design used articulated cars/bogies, 
but except for the six cars that derailed, the remainder of both trains stayed upright and 
linear with the track, the vast majority staying on the track. the aftermath of the collision 
is shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14. The aftermath of the Wenzhou collision
While there were many questions regarding the immediate and long-term responses of 
the MOR and other Chinese government agencies and officials to the incident, the most 
troubling issue was the fact that rescue operations were ordered to stop less than 24 
hours after the collision. the cars that fell off the viaduct were broken up on-site by heavy 
machinery and buried prior to any investigative actions. MoR claimed that the cars were 
quickly scrapped and buried to keep sensitive national technology from falling into the 
wrong hands. others speculated that the claims by Kawasaki and other smaller component 
manufacturers regarding patent theft were the driving factor. 
the lack of credible information regarding the incident or the post-incident response and 
investigations makes it difficult to identify lessons learned. The apparent cause seems to 
have been a poorly designed and/or inadequately tested and evaluated signal- and train 
control system that failed and did not communicate the presence of a train within a block 
to other trains in the area. In addition, similar to the ICe eschede disaster, the severity of 
the incident was exacerbated by the environment in which the equipment failure occurred. 
the greatest number of fatalities and the most injuries and damage were caused by the 
car falling off the viaduct. 
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3. RENFE – March 2002
Figure 15. renFe collision in Torredembarra
The only significant incident on RENFE’s entire HSR network occurred in March 2002 
in torredembarra, about 50 miles southeast of Barcelona. A euromed train traveling 
at about 65 mph through the station to Barcelona collided with a commuter train. the 
commuter train had left the platform and was crossing over onto another track when it was 
struck by the euromed traveling in the same direction. the commuter train was carrying 
approximately 350 passengers, and 290 were on the euromed train. two people were 
killed in the collision; which trains they were on is unclear. In addition, 142 people were 
injured, some of them seriously. Many were trapped in the wreckage, requiring extensive 
extrication efforts by the local emergency services. While there are no available data on 
how many injuries occurred on each train, eyewitness accounts referenced in several 
media stories stated that the majority were on the euromed train. the aftermath of the 
incident is shown in Figure 15.
ReNFe promised an immediate investigation into the cause of the accident. Unfortunately, 
other than the obvious cause—two trains on the same track at the same time—no further 
information from ReNFe or the Spanish government was available. Spain is one of several 
countries that do not release information on rail-accident investigations. 
4. Trenitalia – January 1997
the most tragic incident involving trenitalia HSR service occurred in January 1997, when 
a train left the rails about 30 minutes into its run from Milan to Rome. As it rounded a 
curve at approximately 120 mph, the lead car of the train derailed and ran into a catenary 
support pole. What was originally attributed to excessive speed or a foreign object on the 
tracks was determined, following an investigation, to be caused by a ruptured universal 
joint connecting the traction motors to the wheels. eight people were killed in the accident: 
two engineers, three railroad police officers, a restaurant-car worker, and two passengers. 
The nine-car train, which had a capacity of 480, was carrying only 150 passengers at that 
point in the trip. twenty-nine people were hospitalized with injuries, and many more were 
treated for less-serious injuries.
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5. TGV – September 1988
The first major accident on the TGV happened in September 1988 at a grade crossing 
in Voiron, when a 10-car train running from Grenoble to Paris hit a heavy-duty flatbed 
truck carrying a 100-ton electrical load at 68 mph. the truck, which was not permitted 
to use the crossing, became stranded or stuck on the tracks at the crossing. the lead 
power car derailed, and debris from the truck and its load ripped open the first coach, 
killing one passenger and injuring 60 others. the impact also killed the engineer, and the 
collision became a seminal event in the crashworthiness design and testing process of 
future rolling stock. New versions included improved crash protection for the engineer and 
crash-energy-absorption zones in the power cars and the front of the first trailing coaches.
6. Trenitalia – March 1998
In March 1998, an HSR train collided with a regional passenger train in Castello, near 
Florence, and derailed as it was tilted on a curve. Information on the incident, which is 
listed in the eU rail-accident-investigation database, is very limited. At the time of the 
incident, the cause was thought to be a signal failure. twenty-seven people were injured 
in the accident, and one person on the regional train was killed. 
7. TGV – December 2007
In December 2007, a truck driver was killed when a trainset traveling from paris to Geneva 
hit his truck at 62 mph and derailed. the truck was stuck in the grade crossing when it could 
not pass beneath the overhead catenary. the truck driver had left the cab but was killed by 
the impact before he could safely leave the RoW. the engineer suffered serious injuries, 
and conflicting reports from international news services identified 24 to 34 minor injuries 
to passengers on the train. the other 150 or 160 passengers were safely evacuated. the 
damage to the lead power car was extensive enough for SNCF to scrap the unit.
8. ICE – April 2006
In thun, Switzerland, an engineer hostling two light locomotives was unfamiliar with the 
revised layout of the terminal and did not see a shunting signal directing him to stop. 
passing the signal immediately activated his locomotive’s emergency brakes, but at that 
point the lead engine was fouling the track of an approaching ICe 1 trainset, activating that 
train’s emergency brakes as well. The brake application slowed the ICE train from 45 mph 
to 35 mph by the time of the head-on collision, but the ICe engineer and 30 passengers 
on-board suffered minor injuries. the engineer of the light locomotives safely jumped from 
the units before the collision. All of the involved equipment suffered major damage and 
required extensive rebuilding.
9. TGV – December 1992
In December 1992, a 10-car trainset travelling from Annecy to paris derailed as it passed 
through Macon-Loche station at 168 mph. A flat wheel, resulting from a previous emergency 
stop, caused one of the trainset’s bogies to come off the rail while going through a switch 
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at the entrance to the station. the train stayed upright and linear, and no one on board was 
injured. the derailed wheel, moving at high speeds, launched a lot of ballast (stone) in the 
station, injuring 27 passengers who were waiting on the platform for another train. this was 
the first incident to occur on one of the LGV (dedicated high-speed) lines.
Safety Improvements
Minimizing the Impact of Derailments
Analysis of the incident data revealed that the most frequent cause of accidents in HSR 
operations has been foreign (non-railroad) obstructions on the RoW, with vehicular grade 
crossings topping the list. the remaining causes were most often related to equipment 
malfunctions attributed to flaws in the engineering and/or construction phases of developing 
rolling stock or infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the design of a trainset’s connections 
between cars plays the most significant role in the severity of an incident. In short, the more 
a train—by design—stays linear and upright in a collision or derailment, the better the life-
safety conditions.
Since the day when the first steel wheel rolled down a steel rail, railroaders and engineering 
experts have been trying to figure out how to improve efficiency by reducing wheel-on-rail 
friction. one early, out-of-the-box approach was to reduce the number of wheels/axles under 
each car of the train while still supporting and distributing the weight of the cars’ live load. 
Some early steam-powered streamlined trains and first-generation internal-combustion 
trainsets used partial or complete articulation. By having two carriages or passenger-car 
bodies share a wheelset, the total number of wheels per train could be reduced, thereby 
reducing the overall amount of wheel-on-rail friction. 
Second-generation HSR trainsets have reintroduced this concept. An unintended 
consequence of articulation, demonstrated in several incidents at various speeds, is that 
the trains stay linear and upright. Since the cars do not accordion (fold onto one another), 
telescope into one another, or roll over, the number and severity of traumatic injuries are 
significantly reduced in derailments and collisions.
even trainsets that do not share wheelsets or bogies but employ semi-permanent 
connections rather than knuckle-type couplers are more apt to stay upright and linear in an 
incident. Aside from the eschede accident and the Wenzhou collision, where infrastructure 
design played a critical role, trainsets in almost every other HSR derailment, collision, or 
terrorist attack have stayed upright and in line. the vast majority of commuter and intercity 
passenger trains (which use knuckle-type couplers) that have been involved in a derailment 
or collision in the past several decades have had multiple cars (and locomotives in several 
cases) leaving the tracks and ending up in various states of destruction. 
A modern case of unintended engineering consequences is that of the Shinkansen Series 
200 trainset involved in a 2004 Joetsu derailment, where 11 of the train’s 40 axles derailed 
during an earthquake. the Series 200 truck, or wheelset, had a component inside the 
wheel span that protruded downward and inadvertently pinched the rail between it and the 
inside rail surface. This feature was credited with playing a significant role in maintaining 
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the train’s position and posture in the derailment. Aside from the trailing power car, which 
deviated into a drainage trough in the slab track and slightly lifted after the rails completely 
broke at a joint, the train remained upright and in line.
Following this incident, which resulted in no injuries or fatalities, JR east conducted a 
series of tests on possible rolling-stock and RoW improvements that were intentionally 
designed to prevent catastrophic derailments, specifically in the event of an earthquake. 
JR east’s research and analysis included a systemwide damage assessment and an 
assessment specifically focused on the events that occurred in the derailment and yielded 
two very important conclusions. First, damage to structures (track) and the settlement of 
structures were both negligible and were not considered to be a cause of the derailment. 
Second, based on the results of simulations (modeling), the incident was attributed to the 
railcars oscillating below the center of gravity after receiving large seismic waves, resulting 
in a rocking derailment.
this comprehensive research effort spawned four concepts for further reducing the impact 
of seismic activity. The first, which was introduced in 2006, was the development and 
installation of a railcar guide mechanism. the L-shaped guide is cast as a single unit and 
mounted with four bolts to the underside of the axle (journal) box. the purpose of the 
guide is to significantly limit the lateral deviation of the wheelsets in the trackway during a 
derailment. By being kept in line with the track, the train will be less prone to significantly 
damage the RoW; strike tunnel walls; fall off bridges or viaducts (even though guardrails 
are also currently used in these environments); or foul adjacent tracks. this measure, 
which could ultimately prevent collisions, was developed, tested, and shown to be effective 
in slab-track environments. A separate railcar guide is being developed by JR Central for 
ballasted-track environments.
the next two concepts focused on increasing the probability of maintaining a track’s 
integrity. First, the glued insulated joint (IJ) used to connect rail sections was improved, 
possibly to create expansion joints in the rails. An IJ broke in the Joetsu derailment, 
leading to the significant deviation of the trailing power car from the track. A new glued IJ 
was developed and introduced in 2007 that prevents the rail from breaking even when it 
is subjected to the impact from derailed wheels outfitted with the L-shaped railcar guide. 
the second improvement was the development of a rail anti-toppling device. this concept 
was developed for slab-track applications and uses large, inverted L-shaped brackets to 
grasp the foot of the rail and hold it in place despite the lateral forces placed on it during a 
derailment. A ballasted-track version of the anti-toppling device is also under development 
by JR Central. 
the fourth outcome of the research focused on shortening the time required to apply 
emergency brakes when overhead power is cut off. the original system included a feature 
that shut down power in the overhead catenary in the event of an earthquake and an 
on-board device that applied a train’s emergency brakes when this power shutoff was 
detected. The research yielded a new power-detection device that significantly (relative to 
the situation) shortens the time between power cutoff and emergency-brake application.
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While the integrity of the viaduct in the Joetsu derailment was not compromised by the 
earthquake, many other Shinkansen line bridge and viaduct piers and abutments suffered 
significant damage. In response, JR East developed processes to measurably improve 
structural strength, including the installation of reinforcing steel plates around piers and 
columns.
Reducing Damage from Collisions
the concept of crashworthiness was reevaluated following the September 1988 crash of a 
TGV trainset into a low-boy trailer carrying a large piece of equipment at a grade crossing. 
the train did not derail, but the engineer perished in the collision. Much of the impact 
was absorbed in the engineer’s cab, which completely collapsed on impact. the incident 
investigation also revealed that about 10% of the crash energy had been absorbed in 
deformations of the first trailer. While this incident occurred when the train was moving 
at only 65 mph, it was concluded that energy-absorption patterns, particularly in the first 
trailer, in higher-speed incidents could result in serious injuries to crew and passengers.
The first step taken to address crashworthiness was improving the integrity of the 
engineer’s cab. While the improvements were modeled and tested prior to installation 
to ensure the desired results, the proof has been unfortunately demonstrated on several 
Lines Classiques grade-crossing collisions since then, with various-sized trucks and loads, 
where the engineers have suffered injuries but survived. 
the coupling between the power car and trailers was also reviewed in the post-incident 
research. While the TGV system still employs screw-link couplers and buffers, the buffers 
have been modified to include fuses that activate under crash loads, effectively folding the 
buffer and absorbing energy. Improvements were also made to the car ends to prevent the 
power car from climbing onto the first trailer car. The Scharfenberg couplers in the power-
car noses were redesigned to collapse in multiple-unit operations when placed under 
sudden loads characteristic of collisions. This will allow two facing power cars to make firm 
contact and, it is hoped, prevent telescoping. 
other european and Asian efforts to analyze crashworthiness and rolling-stock integrity 
and strength focus on the balance between a safe carriage and the use of the lightest 
possible materials to maximize weight reduction. Some ICE- and TGV-based trainsets, 
while not derailing, have experienced sizable car-body gashes or more significant failures 
in collisions, increasing the risk of serious injuries to passengers and crew. In the United 
States, all revenue equipment must be built to comply with FRA crashworthiness standards, 
which are typically much more stringent than those in other countries. While this makes it 
impossible for Amtrak or other U.S. passenger-rail systems to buy off-the-shelf trainsets 
from european or Asian suppliers, it ultimately makes the carriage-car bodies stronger and 
more resilient and thus safer in derailments and collisions.
Right-of-Way Protection
TGV and other systems have made advancements in isolating their ROWs, particularly on 
LGV lines, and installing systems to identify intrusions. All LGV lines are grade-separated 
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and fenced off, restricting access by pedestrians and animals. Sensors have also been 
installed on overhead bridges and tunnels to detect falling objects and other accidental or 
intentional perimeter breaches. the sensors communicate an alarm to control centers and 
trains, notifying them of an intrusion. procedures dictate measures to be taken during such 
alarms to avoid collisions and allow for investigations of the situation without completely 
shutting down service in most cases. these steps to prevent and/or detect accidental or 
intentional intrusion on the RoW not only reduce accidents but also enhance security 
measures, particularly in areas of critical vulnerability.
Outside the TGV LGV environment and the China HSR ROW, which were designed and 
built as grade-separated systems, grade-crossing reduction or complete elimination is the 
most significant step HSR operators can take to reduce collision hazards. But, as seen 
on several systems, the potential for vehicles, equipment, pedestrians, and livestock to 
venture onto the RoW, outside of public crossings, must also be addressed. 
Train Control/Signaling/Communications
train control and signaling technology continues to evolve, particularly as train speeds 
increase, rendering human reaction times to line-of-sight, wayside block signals far too 
slow to prevent incidents. As seen in the Wenzhou collision, however, one of the most 
important characteristics of any system is the need to have a fail-safe mode in the event 
of power disruptions or failures or other system malfunctions. 
Signal and train control systems need to be not only more reliable and resilient, but fail-safe 
in sabotage situations as well. In one case, the theft of copper wire from a system caused 
a malfunction and resulted in a collision—fortunately, only a slow-speed collision. Such 
design flaws could be exploited for more-sinister acts than material theft. Short service 
disruptions, no matter how frequent, are always preferable to the alternatives when a 
system fails to stop operations.
conclusion 
The advent and growth of passenger HSR has introduced and/or refined a wide array of 
safety features, only some of which have been discussed in this report. Incidents such 
as collisions and derailments have consistently demonstrated the vast array of inherent 
characteristics and design features that significantly reduce the number of injuries and 
fatalities, as well as damage, particularly in comparison with other passenger-train 
operations such as densely crowded commuter trains.
the lessons learned from the exemplary HSR safety record thus far should form the 
foundation for future developments in infrastructure design, equipment, and system 
technology, as well as operational practices and procedures. extrapolating the lessons 
learned from safety inquiries should lead security planners to focus on reducing 
vulnerabilities.
the record of incidents in europe and Asia clearly reveals that high numbers of injuries 
and deaths occur when HSR trains collide with other trains or massive objects, and that 
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specific locations or design features along the infrastructure put rail passengers at greater 
risk of catastrophic consequences in the event of an incident.
particularly vulnerable areas include:
• Grade crossings that offer easy access to terrorists wanting to derail trains
• Stretches of track with compromised visibility (e.g., adjacent to tunnels or significant 
curves)
• HSR stations with high volumes of other rail traffic 
• Signaling and communications systems that could be subject to cyber attacks
• elevated viaducts
• tunnels
• Sections of RoW adjacent to major structures (e.g., overpasses) that could be 
comprised 
these vulnerabilities are not unique to HSR. Intercity, commuter, and heavy-rail trains all 
operate in the same or similar environments. In the past 50 years, high-speed passenger 
rail has proven that faster trains can not only be as safe as traditional trains, but in many 
cases, they can be safer. This is a benefit not only to HSR systems but to all passenger-
rail operators, particularly those who learn from and borrow from HSR experiences, and 
ultimately the countries and communities they serve. the HSR safety record in europe 
and Asia clearly indicates that formulating a strategy for securing HSR in the United States 
separate and apart from the rest of the passenger, and even freight-rail, network is not 
warranted solely because the trains go faster. the United States simply has the opportunity 
to apply lessons learned to the design and construction of a new system.
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appendIx b:  
a caTalog oF beST SecurITy pracTIceS
While transportation security clearly has improved since 9/11, the basic inventory of 
security measures and best practices has changed little since 2001, although there have 
been improvements and refinements in security measures.
best practices: The latest developments
• threat analysis is better informed by computerized databases that provide details 
and statistical analysis of past terrorist incidents.
• Random passenger-screening regimes have been introduced in some large urban 
rail systems (e.g., New York, Boston, Los Angeles, AMtRAK).
• Improved CCTV is in place, utilizing more-sophisticated software that can, for 
example, alert authorities to suspicious movement or stationary items.
• Vapor-wake-detection canines are being used that are effective for dealing with 
moving groups of people rather than single individuals or objects.
• explosives detection is constantly being improved, with slow progress toward 
remote, or “standoff,” detection.
• Behavioral detection techniques have been implemented and are being improved, 
although they remain controversial.
• Suspicious-activity reports are being systematized.
• the public is being enlisted in surveillance efforts.
• Security is now a criterion in train and coach design and construction.
best practices: Intelligence and Threat analysis
• periodic meetings with federal, state, and local authorities covering stations and 
RoWs.
• Analysis of local crime patterns.
• enlistment of vendors in stations, along with merchants, parking attendants, and 
other surrounding stations, in awareness programs.
• enlistment of passengers in “see something, say something” programs facilitated 
through mobile phones.
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best practices: Stations
• Designed to have open rather than confined spaces, no narrow corridors.
• Designed to accommodate temporary increases in security.
• Good visibility for surveillance, including CCTV cameras.
• Good lighting, no dimly lit corners.
• target hardening to withstand blasts and prevent catastrophic damage from external, 
large vehicle-borne bombs.
• No highly combustible materials or sources of toxic fumes or shrapnel.
• No hiding or hidden spaces.
• Reversible fans for the evacuation of contaminated air or smoke.
• transparent elevators and, where possible, walls.
• Effective CCTV coverage with good resolution, linked with analytic software.
• Bomb-resistant, well-placed trash containers utilizing transparent trash bags, 
frequently emptied.
• Removal of storage lockers or their separation to safer portions of the station.
• Designed to be easy to maintain and well maintained.
• Adequate emergency exits.
• Designated evacuation routes.
• Facilitated emergency response.
• Safe sites within the station for cases where evacuation is unfeasible.
• Visible staff and security presence.
• explosives-detection canine patrols.
• Chemical- and radioactive-substances detection systems.
• Staff trained in emergency procedures (dealing with suspicious objects, active 
shooters, etc.).
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• Station staff and rail personnel visibly badged.
• Vendors vetted.
best practices: Track protection
• Infrastructure and RoW design to minimize the potential for catastrophic 
consequences such as cars plunging off viaducts or HSR incidents compromising 
other structures. (extra guardrails enabled the Nevsky express in 2007 to transit a 
bridge before derailing despite the bombing of the rails, instead of the cars falling 
off the bridge.)
• Seamless rails.
• Solid roadbeds.
• tamper-detection systems on rails.
• RoWs fenced, alarmed, and patrolled.
• Signaling systems protected against cyber intrusions.
• RoW search protocols in place.
• CCTV coverage of critical sections (bridges, tunnels, etc.).
• Sweep trains that precede daily traffic.
• Rail staff and employees trained to recognize suspicious activity and objects.
best practices: passenger Security
• ID checks.
• passenger-screening protocols in place, vetted and tested for constitutionality, 
legality, public tolerance (in place in AMtRAK and some commuter rail systems in 
the United States). 
• explosives-detection regimes for selected passengers (explored in U.S. pilot 
projects).
• Metal detectors and luggage x-ray (currently used only for eurostar).
• explosives-detection canines on platforms and trains.
• CCTV on coaches to discourage ordinary crime and provide investigative leads if 
an incident occurs.
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• Random armed security (visible and undercover) presence in stations and on trains.
• Riders enlisted in “see something, say something” campaigns.
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